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From Sex for Pleasure to Sex for Parenthood:
How the Law Manufactures Mothers
Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid*
As soon as sperm enter a woman, so do law and politics—or so the decades-long
disputes surrounding abortion suggest. Now, however, renewed debates regarding
contraceptives indicate that legal and political interference with women’s sexual and
reproductive autonomy may actually precede the sperm. This Article argues that
women even thinking about having sex are increasingly defined socially and legally as
“mothers.” Via this broad definition of who is a “mother,” the State extends its reach
into women’s decisionmaking throughout their reproductive lifetimes.
This Article argues that the State simultaneously devalues women’s choices to have sex
for pleasure, which this Article calls “desexualization,” and uses medical rituals
associated with motherhood, which this Article calls “ritualization,” to persuade
women to accept the role of mother. Desexualization and ritualization signal the State’s
attempt to influence women’s sexual and reproductive decisionmaking not only in the
context of abortion, but also in the areas of contraception, pregnancy, and childbirth.
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Introduction
“‘[B]eing against sex is not good. . . . Sex is popular.’”

1

Sex is complicated. It can be physical, emotional, violent, tender, for
2
pleasure or for procreation, and any combination of these. Arguably, no
other act can have so many different meanings and consequences,
pregnancy included. But two things are certain: sex is popular, and
3
women, specifically, are sexual beings. Perhaps due to its near-universal
4
appeal, sex is also a frequent subject of legal regulation. Today, women
are regulated—not as sexual beings but as would-be mothers—long
before they ever have sex and certainly before they see a fetal image on
an ultrasound screen, whether before an abortion or as a milestone on a
5
path to childbirth.
For women, “[s]ex for pleasure, for fun, or even for building
6
relationships is completely absent from our national conversation.”

1. Maureen Dowd, Ghastly Outdated Party, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/dowd-ghastly-outdated-party.html (quoting Republican strategist Alex
Castellanos). Sex may be procreative or not or to achieve intimacy or not. See generally Laura A.
Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 Emory L.J. 809 (2010). “Sex” in this
Article refers to consensual, potentially procreative intercourse. See Krisztina Morvai, What is Missing
from the Rhetoric of Choice? A Feminist Analysis of the Abortion Dilemma in the Context of Sexuality, 5
UCLA Women’s L.J. 445, 460 (1995). “Pleasure,” as used in this Article, is a positive “feeling, a sensation,
a subjectively experienced phenomenon” stemming from sex. See Paul R. Abramson & Steven D.
Pinkerton, With Pleasure: Thoughts on the Nature of Human Sexuality 45 (1995).
2. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 225;
see Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 2014) (arguing that “sexual
pleasure has value because of the pleasure it provides and apart from its ability to serve other ends
such as emotional bonding or procreation”). Sex for pleasure and sex for procreation are not
necessarily disaggregated, though in this Article the intent of sex for pleasure is pleasure itself, not
procreation.
3. See Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Behavior in the United States: Results from a National
Probability Sample of Men and Women Ages 14–94, 7 J. Sexual Med. 255, 262 (2010) (detailing
women’s varied sexual activities). Anti-abortion-rights advocates may be portrayed as being “antisex.” See Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 210 (1984) (noting that people
who are anti-abortion rights “value sex, of course, but they value it for its traditional benefits (babies)”
rather than for intimacy).
4. Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 185 (1987). For examples of social and legal regulation, see
Elizabeth Bernstein & Laurie Schaffner, Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity
(2005); John D’Emilio & Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in
America (2012).
5. See infra Part III; see also Beth Burkstrand-Reid, The War on Sex for Pleasure, Huffington
Post (May 16, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beth-burkstrandreid/war-onwomen_b_1521804.html (arguing that the “war on sex” targets both women and sex itself).
6. Jessica Valenti, The Purity Myth: How America’s Obsession with Virginity is Hurting
Young Women 43 (2009) [hereinafter Valenti, Purity Myth]. Strikingly, sex and sexuality are often
not associated with motherhood. Beth Montemurro & Jenna Marie Siefken, MILFS and Matrons:
Images and Realities of Mothers’ Sexuality, 16 Sexuality & Culture 366, 367 (2012); Rebecca W.
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Instead, the national focus is on “morality,” a one-word descriptor for
the anxiety that female sexuality provokes in the collective
7
consciousness. Increasingly, the State is the moral arbitrator of women’s
sexual choices.
8
While the dialogue on sexual activity has long focused on abortion,
more recent controversies have involved non-abortion reproductive
9
health issues, such as contraception. These debates boil down to one
question about every woman: when she has sex, is she acting as a “slut,”
by having sex for pleasure, or as a “mother,” by having sex for
10
procreation? The answer to this question has profound legal
consequences for contraception policy, abortion rights, and even medical
11
care during pregnancy. This Article argues that for women today, there
is no such thing as sex for pleasure under the law: only sex for the
purpose of becoming a mother is considered legitimate, and women’s
12
sexual and reproductive health choices are regulated accordingly.

Tardy, “But I Am a Good Mom”: The Social Construction of Motherhood Through Health-Care
Conversations, 29 J. Contemp. Ethnography 433, 462–63 (2000). Women’s sexuality is culturally
constructed and influenced by male dominance. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified:
Discourses on Life and Law 53 (1987).
7. Carol Groneman, Nymphomania: A History xvii (2000); Marty Klein, America’s War on
Sex: The Attack on Law, Lust and Liberty 2 (2006); Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality,
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005).
8. State Policy Trends: Abortion and Contraception in the Crosshairs, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr.
13, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/04/13/index.html (“In the first three
months of 2012, legislators in 45 of the 46 legislatures that have convened this year introduced 944
provisions related to reproductive health and rights. Half of these provisions would restrict abortion
access.”).
9. Richard Wolf & Cathy Lynn Grossman, Obama Mandate on Birth Control Coverage Stirs
Controversy, USA Today (Feb. 9, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/201202-08/catholics-contraceptive-mandate/53014864/1.
10. “Slut” is used in this Article because of its use in the Sandra Fluke controversy. See Julie Rovner,
Law Student Makes Case for Contraceptive Coverage, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Feb. 23 2012, 4:39 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/02/23/147299323/law-student-makes-case-for-contraceptivecoverage. “Slut” is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “a promiscuous woman; especially:
PROSTITUTE.”
Slut
Definition,
Merriam-Webster.com,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/slut (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see Leora Tanenbaum, Slut!: Growing Up Female with a Bad
Reputation 11 (1999) (arguing that “slut-bashing” is about more than sex—it reflects a girl’s failure to
behave according to social dictates). This Article adopts the Oxford Dictionary’s definition that
motherhood
occurs
after
birth.
Mother
Definition,
OxfordDictionaries.com,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mother (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“[A]
woman in relation to a child or children to whom she has given birth.”). This Article also acknowledges
both the physical and social burdens of motherhood. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality,
Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 340–41 (2010).
11. See infra Parts II, III.
12. Robert D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion: A Legal Interpretation 13–16 (1988).
This is not to say that puritanical notions of sexuality are new. See generally Gail Collins, America’s
Women: Four HundredYears of Dolls, Drudges, Helpmates, and Heroines (2003) (discussing the
history of women, including women and sex).
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So if you are a woman, are you a “slut” or a “mother”? Given that
nearly all women use contraception during their lifetime, there are a lot
of “sluts”—women having sex without intending to procreate—out
13
there. This Article argues that the law regulates women’s reproductive
choices by re-conceptualizing all sexually active (or potentially sexually
14
active) women as mothers. Motherhood is not just a biological status; it
is a socially constructed role with built-in behavioral expectations—
15
including some surrounding sexuality—that are imposed on women.
In the context of abortion care, the State’s use of the law to regulate
women’s reproductive choices is clear—focusing solely on abortion is a
reductionist view of women, their health, and the State’s role in women’s
16
lives. By broadly defining “mother” to include all women of
reproductive age, the State is able to extend its reach over women’s
17
reproductive lives and autonomous decisionmaking. Moreover, when a
woman is pregnant, the State can assert its authority to prohibit abortion
or use its power to regulate the choices of the “mother” in order to
18
protect the fetus. These are but examples; the State regulates a woman’s
entire reproductive lifetime, not simply specific points within it. This
blinds us to opportunities to improve women’s health holistically and
reduces women’s autonomy.
This Article argues that the law effectively re-characterizes women
as mothers by (1) desexualizing women, or advancing the notion that

13. Ninety-nine percent of women fifteen to forty-four years of age who have had intercourse
have used contraception. William D. Mosher & Jo Jones, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
Use of Contraception in the United States: 1982–2008, at 5 (Aug. 2010).
14. Cynthia R. Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights
26 (1993) (“In this legal and political discourse, women’s autonomy is traded against (and often traded
away) by women’s right to reproductive choice.”). In the case of women who are already parenting,
they are re-characterized as “mothers” of additional children-to-be, regardless of whether future
pregnancy or parenting is desired. These women can still be “sluts” if they have sex for pleasure
instead of sex for further procreation.
15. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Beyond “A Woman’s Right to Choose”: Feminist Ideas About
Reproductive Rights, in The Reproductive Rights Reader: Law, Medicine, and the Construction of
Motherhood 107 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (“[W]oman’s reproductive situation is never the result of
biology alone, but of biology mediated by social and cultural organization.”); see Elisabeth Badinter, The
Conflict: How Modern Motherhood Undermines the Status of Women 12–14 (2010); Jessica Valenti,
Why Have Kids?: A New Mom Explores the Truth About Parenting and Happiness 4 (2012)
[hereinafter Why Have Kids?]; Jessica Valenti, He’s a Stud, She’s A Slut And 49 Other Double
Standards Every Woman Should Know 118–21 (2008); M. M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of
“Mother”, in Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood 73 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). There are many types of mothers, mothering, and
motherhood. See Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 15, 31–32
(1992).
16. Lynn M. Paltrow, Abortion Issue Divides, Distracts Us from Common Threats and Threads,
A.B.A: Persps., Winter 2005.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Parts II, III.
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women should only have sex for procreation, and (2) ritualizing
women’s healthcare by viewing and treating women (pregnant or not) as
“pre-mothers,” and using the law to impose medical and social practices
20
associated with “good mothers” upon them. The law embodies both
desexualization and ritualization in many aspects of the regulation of
women’s sexuality. The presence of desexualization and ritualization in
law and policy serves as a warning that the State is reaching into
women’s health-related decisionmaking. This Article further argues that
desexualization and ritualization can be mobilized as legal tools used to
transform women into “mothers,” thus making their decisionmaking and
their bodies fair game for regulation.
Part I of this Article examines the legal transformation of women
into mothers by analyzing the conversion of “women’s health” to
“maternal health” in abortion jurisprudence. Subpart A briefly examines
the conceptualization of health generally, women’s health, and maternal
health. It further details problems posed by the use of “maternal health”
in the law as a descriptor for health issues faced by pregnant women.
Subpart B argues that abortion jurisprudence is the exemplar for how the
law co-opts women’s health and thus transforms even non-pregnant
women into mothers.
Part II argues that in both the abortion context and beyond, sexual
and reproductive health laws desexualize women, re-characterizing
women’s desire to have sex for pleasure as an act of procreation instead,
thus facilitating regulation of women’s health far beyond abortion.
Subpart A defines desexualization as advancing the notion that women
should only have sex for procreation, and examines its development in
the law. Subpart B argues that desexualization begins before sex, through
stigmatization of sexually active women, as the debate around the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—otherwise known as Obamacare—
exemplifies. Subpart C uses the emergency contraception controversy to
illustrate that once a woman has sex, she is assumed to have consented to
the role of “mother,” thus allowing the woman to be legally treated as a
mother and her health treated as “maternal health.”
Part III discusses the impact of ritualization in reproductive health
law. Specifically, Part III focuses on how ritualization, in combination
with desexualization, is mobilized in an attempt to control women’s
reproductive decisionmaking. Subpart A defines ritualization as the use
of medical experiences related to pregnancy and childbirth to influence
the sexual and reproductive decisionmaking of women. Abortion laws
19. For many, this means having sex within marriage, even if that is not the case in practice.
Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 243 (1992).
20. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, and
the Complications of Pre-Motherhood, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 313, 337 (2008).
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mimic the rituals of obstetrical care, for example, as a way of pushing
women toward motherhood. Subpart B examines how this ritualization
occurs outside of the abortion context, specifically during a continuing
pregnancy, an area subject to extensive—but under-examined—legal
regulation.
Finally, Part IV theorizes that future laws will employ ritualization
21
and desexualization to reduce women’s reproductive autonomy.
Subpart A discusses the current use of desexualization and ritualization
in current controversies in contraception regulation and abortion
legislation. Subpart B hypothesizes how future regulation of
contraceptives may rest on desexualization and ritualization.
At its core, this Article theorizes that the law re-conceptualizes
sexually active women, pushing them toward the role of a lifetime:
22
motherhood. After all, using contraceptives, for example, is “a license
to do things in a sexual realm that is counter to how things are supposed
23
to be.” When women resist the role of mother, they face
marginalization and stigmatization—and, in some cases, legal control of
their decisionmaking.

I. Women’s Health Is Dead. Long Live Maternal Health
In 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
recommended that all women of childbearing age take vitamins, abstain
from certain behaviors such as smoking and heavy drinking, and monitor
24
their weight, all to prepare for eventual motherhood. In essence, the
25
government indicated that it viewed women as mothers-to-be. Women
are transformed into mothers via government actions that are ostensibly
21. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law,
53 Ohio St. L.J. 1205, 1207 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Code of Perfect Pregnancy] (“However, there
is outstanding the idea and practice of controlling women with regard to conception, gestation, and
childbirth in ways that express dominant cultural notions of motherhood.”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles,
Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational
Autonomy, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 567, 568–69 (2011) (discussing how lawmakers and the public are
“obsessed” with reproduction). This Article focuses on how potentially procreative sex is regulated.
Procreative sex is but one form of sexual expression.
22. Turning women into “mothers” in the law via desexualization and ritualization may be
intentional or an unintended result of broader social and legal policies.
23. Charles P. Pierce, Santorum’s War Against Women, Continued, Esquire (Jan. 3, 2012,
3:41 PM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/rick-santorum-contraception-6632083 (quoting Rick
Santorum); see John Bancroft, Editorial: The Pill, Sex, and the Politics of Gender, Medical Aspects of
Human Sexuality (Mar. 2002) (“The idea that [the pill] might allow unmarried women to enjoy sex
free of fears of pregnancy was anathema to many physicians, and concern that it might ‘let loose’ the
sexuality of married women was not far below the surface.”) (on file with Author).
24. Why Have Kids?, supra note 15, at 3–4.
25. Id.; see Rebecca Kukla, Measuring Mothering, 1 Int’l J. Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
67, 69 (2008); Jessica Valenti, Full Frontal Feminism 154–55 (2007).
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designed to protect women’s health. We see this in regulatory contexts
such as the CDC recommendations, as well as via various statutes and
court decisions: the underlying questions are whose health is most
important—the pregnant woman’s or the fetus’—and who gets to make
26
that determination.
A. From Woman to Mother, Women’s Health to Maternal Health
Abortion jurisprudence provides the quintessential example of the
27
legal conceptualization of women as mothers. We see this directly in
Supreme Court rhetoric, which emphasizes “maternal” health despite the
fact that not all sexually active women are mothers and not all women
28
want to be mothers.
To understand the differences between health, women’s health, and
maternal health, one may visualize a funnel. At the top of the funnel is
the broadest category of “health,” a non-sex-specific term referring to “a
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely
29
the absence of disease or infirmity.” Further into the narrowing funnel,
we reach “women’s health,” which includes sex-specific health issues
faced by women in their lifetime, including but not limited to concerns
30
based on women’s unique sexual and reproductive capacity. Below
women’s health is an even smaller subset of women’s health—some call
it “maternal health”—which specifically relates to pregnancy, birth, and

26. Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 145, 203 (2010).
27. Luker, supra note 3, at 193 (“[T]he abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because
it is a referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood.”).
28. Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting
Reproductive Rights, 5 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 147, 157–58 (1996) (“[T]he United States Supreme
Court has consistently viewed women through their reproductive capacity. Women have been
subsumed into their reproductive organs. The woman as an independent person with interests and
needs is invisible in the Court’s decisions: instead, law has treated women first and foremost as
potential or actual mothers.”).
29. World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Definition of Health, http://www.who.int/about/
definition/en/print.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). Within its general “health” definition, the WHO
includes the non-sex-specific concept of “reproductive health,” which concerns the functioning of
“reproductive processes, functions and system at all stages of life. Reproductive health, therefore, implies
that people are able to have a responsible, satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.” WHO, Health Topics:
Reproductive Health, http://www.who.int/topics/reproductive_health/en (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
30. See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Nat’l Insts. of Health, Women’s Health,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/womenshealth.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (“Women have
unique health issues. And some of the health issues that affect both men and women can affect women
differently. Unique issues include pregnancy, menopause, and conditions of the female organs.
Women can have a healthy pregnancy by getting early and regular prenatal care. They should also get
recommended breast cancer, cervical cancer, and bone density screenings. Women and men also have
many of the same health problems. But these problems can affect women differently.”).
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31

post-partum care. Only some women experience these health issues.
Almost one in five women end their reproductive years without having a
32
child, double the percentage in the 1970s.
When used in a legal context, the descriptor “maternal health” is
often coupled with use of the term “mother” to refer to pregnant
33
women. When these terms are used together, the woman’s health is no
longer her own, but is tied up with the demands of motherhood even
prior to childbirth. Thus, judicial use of the term “maternal health” when
discussing pregnancy and childbirth is particularly problematic. Women’s
health is often reduced to maternal health, a transformation with
34
significant implications. Motherhood, after all, is not just a physical
35
condition; it is also a social role. In other words, legal protections of
maternal health are not just a means to keeping women healthy; they
propel women toward accepting a mothering role. This role requires a
woman to subrogate her needs—sexual and otherwise—to the needs of
36
her fetus or child. In reproductive health law, this means that the law
focuses primarily on how the medical treatment of her body impacts her
37
ability to fulfill her socially defined role as a mother.
Abortion jurisprudence often conceptualizes all women as mothers
or potential mothers. Such laws push women toward “maternal” roles,
even when women are clearly rejecting motherhood, and ignore the
38
importance of sex for pleasure. Thus, abortion jurisprudence signals
that to regulate women’s reproductive autonomy, the law conceptualizes
them as mothers. The law does so often by invoking “maternal health”
even when a woman attempts to avoid motherhood. This signals
desexualization, the notion that women should only have sex for
procreation, and ritualization, viewing and treating women (pregnant or

31. See, e.g., WHO, Health Topics: Maternal Health, http://www.who.int/topics/maternal_health/en
(last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
32. Gretchen Livingston & D’Vera Cohn, Childlessness Up Among All Women; Down Among
Women with Advanced Degrees, Pew Research Ctr. (June 25, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/
1642/more-women-without-children.
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See Reilly, supra note 28, at 157–58, 164–65. Abortion jurisprudence frequently contains
paternalistic concern for women’s mental health, suggesting, for example, that women who have an
abortion will regret their decision. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and
Abortion Decision-Making, 16 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 223, 290 (2009).
35. Petchesky, supra note 15, at 107.
36. Badinter, supra note 15, at 12–14; Judith Warner, Perfect Madness: Motherhood in the
Age of Anxiety 61–71 (2005); Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of Motherhood and the
Future of Abortion Rights, 21 Tex. J. Women & L. 47, 56–58 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007); Nancy Ehrenreich, The
Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L.J. 492, 496–97 (1993).
38. State Policy Trends 2013: Abortion Bans Move to the Fore, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 11,
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/04/11/index.html.
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not) as “pre-mothers” and using the law to impose medical and social
39
practices associated with “good mothers” upon them.
B. Abortion and Motherhood Via Maternal Health
In Roe v. Wade, the germinal case confirming the right to have an
abortion in some circumstances, the Supreme Court established a
tripartite framework to judge the constitutionality of abortion
40
restrictions. In the standard itself, the Court vacillates between treating
the pregnant woman as a woman or as a mother; its conceptualization of
the woman seeking an abortion is dependent upon the point at which she
41
seeks to end the pregnancy. The woman remains a person separate from
the fetus until the end of the first trimester: “For the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
42
woman’s attending physician.” The woman is still seen, at this point, as
a person experiencing a medical condition—pregnancy—not a woman
43
occupying the socially defined role of mother.
However, at some point after the end of the first trimester, a
“pregnant woman’s” health becomes “maternal health” in the rhetoric of
the decision, suggesting that the woman is then a mother: “For the stage
subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
44
45
maternal health.” That shift in language is illustrative. From this point
in the pregnancy, the State’s interest is no longer conditioned solely on
46
the pregnant woman’s body, but also on her role as a mother.

39. See Mutcherson, supra note 20, at 337; infra Parts II, III.
40. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
41. Id. Roe did not give women a positive right—the right existed naturally. Robin West, From
Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1403
(2009).
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
43. But see Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception and the ACA: The Realignment of Women’s
Health, 55 How. L.J. 731, 762–64 (2012) [hereinafter Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health]
(arguing that abortion has been disconnected from women’s health).
44. Roe, 410 U.S at 164 (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the “mother” descriptor continues
through the “stage subsequent to viability” when it says the State “may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
45. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 13–14 (1987); Julie
Novkov, A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 155, 159–60 (1992).
46. See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution 42
(1995); Ikemoto, Code of Perfect Pregnancy, supra note 21, at 1285 (stating that reproduction-related
regulations “devalue women as persons by characterizing women as wombs”).
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Many viewed Roe as empowering women because it ensured their
ability to control their reproductive lives and to do so safely. But while
Roe restricted the State’s ability to limit women’s access to abortion, it
47
also empowered the State. The decision specifically approved of
abortion regulations during certain points in pregnancy if those
48
regulations were premised on protecting “maternal health.” The Court
uses the descriptor “mother” for women who clearly rejected that role at
49
that time—they chose to have an abortion. Roe signaled a deeper social
and legal shift toward conceptualizing all sexually active women as
mothers, a move that is now evident even outside of the abortion
50
context. As we will see, many of the most expansive actions of courts
and legislatures today rely on Roe and its progeny, either for its healthrelated language, for its language on the State’s interest in the fetus, or
for the general assertion that the State may regulate women’s bodies.
Some abortion cases subsequent to Roe chipped away at the right to
51
access abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for example, gave wide
52
berth to government regulation of the procedure. But issues related to
the health of pregnant women and their rejection of their socially defined
role as mothers came to a head in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the
Supreme Court upheld the federal partial-birth abortion ban even
53
though it did not include an exception for the pregnant woman’s health.
Although the very word choice in the Roe decision—the shift from
“pregnant woman” to “mother”—showed that pregnant women were
considered would-be mothers after the first trimester of pregnancy,
Gonzales further propelled the conceptualization of all pregnant women
as mothers. Gonzales explicitly invoked notions of maternal guilt to

47. See generally Cristina Page, How the Pro-Choice Movement Saved America: Freedom,
Politics, and the War on Sex (2006) (discussing the continuing erosion of reproductive rights).
48. Roe vests the decision to have an abortion—and how to have that abortion—not with the
woman, but largely with her doctor. 410 U.S. at 164–65.
49. Id. at 120.
50. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade,
56 Emory L.J. 843, 844 (2007); Reilly, supra note 28, at 159–160; see also infra Parts II, III.
51. For a discussion of the health impact of major abortion rulings, see generally Beth A.
Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health
Jurisprudence, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 97 (2010) [hereinafter Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman].
For an overview of major abortion decisions, see David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key
Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, Pew Research Ctr.: Religion & Pub. Life Project
(Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/A-History-of-Key-Abortion-Rulings-of-the-USSupreme-Court.aspx.
52. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). Casey also uses
“mother” as a descriptor of pregnant women. Id. at 860.
53. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164–65 (2007).
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shame pregnant women seeking an abortion and change their minds.
The majority opinion says:

54

Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child. . . . Whether to have an abortion requires
a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can
55
follow.

The opinion continues:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fastdeveloping brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
56
form.

These passages emphasize that the Court views women as mothers
before childbirth, that the role of “mother” impacts legal rights, and that
the Court believes that motherhood should impact the choices women
make.
It cannot be overemphasized that the metaphysical transformation
of pregnant women into mothers in abortion jurisprudence was done to
women who were actively attempting to avoid the motherhood role at
57
that time. So it should come as no surprise that in non-abortion
contexts, invocations of the social role of mother is used to limit women’s
reproductive and sexual autonomy.
When stripped to its core, sexual and reproductive health
jurisprudence (abortion and beyond) is founded on what this Article
labels desexualization and ritualization, both of which reinforce the
notion, so apparent in abortion jurisprudence, that all women are or will
be mothers and should be regulated (and should themselves act) as such.
“Desexualization” is the mechanism by which the State expresses its

54. Id. at 184–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); B. Jessie Hill, Dangerous Terrain: Mapping the Female
Body in Gonzales v. Carhart, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 649, 654–55 (2010).
55. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted). The abortion procedure at issue is called
“partial-birth abortion,” evoking the ultimate experience of motherhood: birth. Id. at 125.
56. Id. at 159–60.
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (“By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of
childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate
women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of course.”); see
Randi Hutter Epstein, Get Me Out: A History of Childbirth from the Garden of Eden to the
Sperm Bank 114 (2010) (repeating the adage that women are made to bring children into the world);
Balkin, supra note 50, at 851 (“[A]bortion laws treat women not as murderers, but as mothers, as
people who exist to rear children.”).
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moral disapproval of any type of sexual activity other than sex for
parenthood and, as a corollary, treats even the actions of sexually active
women (or women considering sexual activity) as tantamount to
accepting motherhood. “Ritualization” is the legally sanctioned use of
the rituals or rites of passage associated with continuing pregnancies to
push women toward accepting motherhood and behaving as “good
mothers” even to the detriment of their health or rights. Part II discusses
the first of these tools, desexualization, and how it contributes to the
law’s manufacturing of mothers.

II. Which Comes First: Sex or Motherhood? Law and
Desexualizing Women
There is no doubt that many women enjoy sex, but are they
58
supposed to? Women are subjected to endless, sometimes conflicting,
59
edicts about how and whether they should express their sexuality.
Desexualizing women through the law minimizes the importance, or
even denies the existence, of women’s desire for sex for pleasure and
then re-characterizes women’s sexual actions as implicit acceptance of
60
motherhood. It is the age-old division of women into Madonnas and
61
whores.
Although the right of women to access contraceptives was
recognized decades ago, regulation of and access to contraceptives have
62
again emerged as legal issues. Two examples of this are the controversy
63
surrounding contraceptive coverage in the ACA, and the regulation of
oral emergency contraceptives, also called the morning-after pill, or
64
referred to by the brand names “Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.” In both
58. Joann Ellison Rodgers, Sex: A Natural History 8 (2001); Herbenick et al., supra note 3, at
255; Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day
Reconstruction Method, 306 Science 1776, 1777 (2004). Women also partake in—and sometimes lead
companies in—the nearly two billion dollar adult toy industry. Angus Loten, Why Sex Sells More Than
Ever, Inc. (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.inc.com/articles/2008/01/sex.html.
59. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Cas Wouters, Sexualization: Have Sexualization
Processes Changed Direction?, 13 Sexualities 723, 724–26 (2010).
60. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 809. But see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality,
and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 838 (1988) (“A list of acceptable
inducements [to sex] would surely include procreation, emotional intimacy, and physical pleasure. Of
these three inducements, procreation probably plays a less significant social role today than either
intimacy or pleasure.”).
61. Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott, Sexual Skirmishes and Feminist Factions: Twenty-Five Years of
Debate on Women and Sexuality, in Feminism and Sexuality: A Reader 3 (Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott
eds., 1996).
62. See infra Parts II.B, C; see also Page, supra note 47, at 21 (asserting that some anti-abortion
groups equate contraceptives and abortion).
63. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.);
see infra Part II.B.
64. See infra Part II.C.
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contexts, women are desexualized, their desire to have sex for pleasure is
delegitimized, and sexual activity is re-characterized as an affirmative
step toward motherhood. And, once again, any act that casts a woman as
a “mother” expands the State’s ability to intervene in her choices.
A. Defining Desexualization
A core aspect of conceptualizing women as mothers in the law is
viewing them—and treating them legally—as people who should engage
in sexual activity for the purpose of parenthood, not pleasure: this is
65
desexualization. Desexualization consists of two actions: (1) shaming
sex for pleasure and (2) reinforcing a norm that sex should be for the
purpose of procreation or, for women more specifically, motherhood.
66
In society, motherhood and sexuality are in opposition. A woman’s
success as a mother is defined in part by perceptions about her sexuality;
some studies find that a less sexual mother is deemed to be a better
67
mother. The legal question, then, is when does a woman actually
68
become a mother: upon a child’s birth or sometime before? Abortion
jurisprudence demonstrates that the law labels a woman as a mother and
her health “maternal” well before birth. But as the debates raging about
contraceptives show, a woman may be conceptualized as a mother even
69
before sex.
The path to the desexualization of women in the law has been
circuitous. For example, the Supreme Court has not been entirely
prudish when it has confronted the issue of contraception, but that does
not mean that it openly accepts sex for pleasure. Early on, members of

65. Reilly, supra note 28, at 204 (describing “the assumptions that women are morally responsible
only when fulfilling traditional expectations of the mother-role”). “Desexualization” is used in many
ways. See, e.g., Charles Winick, Desexualization in American Life 1–2 (1995) (recognizing that
“changes were occurring in the social and sex roles, social structure, and popular culture” in the 1960s,
when the book was written); Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385 (using desexualization to
refer to changes mothers experience post-partum); Wouters, supra note 59, at 726–28 (discussing
desexualization in history, when sex was a duty and not for pleasure); see also Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1401 (2009) (Disability); Anthony C.
Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa Clara L. Rev. 763, 777 (2004) (Samesex relationships); Morvareed Z. Salehpour, Election 2008: Sexism Edition: The Problem of Sex
Stereotyping, 19 UCLA Women’s L.J. 117, 134–35 (2012) (Politics).
66. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 367. See generally Ariella Friedman et al., Sexuality
and Motherhood: Mutually Exclusive in Perception of Women, 38 Sex Roles 781 (1998).
67. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99.
68. Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change . . .: Abortion Politics & the Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 370–72 (2010) [hereinafter BurkstrandReid, The More Things Change]; Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting
Definitions From Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 688, 689 (1998).
69. Page, supra note 47, at 30 (“[C]hildren are an intended purpose of intercourse, and parents
should therefore act to responsibly care for and protect their pre-born children.”).
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the Court in Poe v. Ullman signaled that they recognized the importance
70
of marital intimacy. The Court took a step toward recognizing the
importance of sex for pleasure in Griswold v. Connecticut, which
71
confirmed that married persons had the right to use contraceptives. The
Griswold Court said that “intimacy” had a role in the lives of married
couples (and thus in the lives of married women) but, as the decision did
not dwell on sex itself, the precedent focused on relationship building
72
rather than pleasure. By focusing on the marital relationship, Griswold
also impliedly served a shaming function against sexually active people
73
who were not married.
Later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court jumped into law and
sexuality with both feet by confirming that “whatever the rights of the
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same
74
for the unmarried and the married alike.” But again, the right did not
focus on sex for pleasure. The Court’s discomfort with sexuality lingered
75
in tone, calling sex by the euphemism “the physical act.” Shaming was
76
not overt, but the Court’s discomfort with sexual activity was.
The inevitable successor to the contraception cases—abortion
jurisprudence—shows how the seed of the Court’s discomfort with
sexuality grew into desexualization and, eventually, would be expressed
77
in legislation and jurisprudence. Roe obscured the significance of
physical intimacy by implicitly shaming sexually active women who were

70. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 519–20 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and
Belonging 23–24 (2007).
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
72. Id. at 482 (“This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife
and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”); see Law, supra note 2, at 226; see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“After Griswold, it was established that the right to
make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”).
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Finally, it should be said of the
Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity
or misconduct.”).
74. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1446 (1992).
75. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451 n.8.
76. The Court acknowledged, however, that sex for pleasure happened. Id. at 452–53 (“To say
that contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons who will
nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an
unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support.”); see
also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
77. Abortion regulations “impair the possibility of sexual pleasure for women, and aggravate the
force of sexual fear.” Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 371 (1992).
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78

not married. Women seeking an abortion were pushed toward accepting
79
the role of mother.
Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, further cast women having
sex outside of marriage as sexually suspect. In Doe, the Court went out
of its way to establish that the “situation did not involve extramarital sex
and its product,” implying that women who do not transgress that
boundary are somehow more worthy of constitutional protection than
80
those who do. The Court’s decision exemplifies how motherhood is
treated as a “social institution,” one that facilitates the control of women:
81
in this case, their sexuality.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey further retreated from Eisenstadt’s
limited recognition of sex for pleasure. Although Casey recognizes that
intimate decisionmaking relies to some degree on the availability of
abortion, the decision, in part, grounded women’s right to choose
82
abortion in their ability to succeed as workers. Sex and pregnancy were,
at least in part, treated as economic issues and, at least impliedly, not
83
issues of pleasure. Casey abandoned Roe’s trimester framework in favor
84
of the amorphous “undue burden” standard. In Casey, the State interest
in women’s health begins to become a veil for a more politicized
85
interest—the pre-viable fetus. This interest in the pre-viable fetus
86
further catapulted women toward motherhood.
The government’s ability to directly regulate sex was arguably
curtailed by Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court struck down
a Texas sodomy statute, but Lawrence may have had as much—if not

78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (noting that Roe was not married); id. at 164 (stating the
abortion decision “must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician”).
79. Id. at 120, 164–65. But see Posner, supra note 19, at 333 (discussing the Roe decision as one
supporting “morally indifferent sex”); see Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 442 (2013) (discussing how abortion stigma relates to “shame associated with
conduct that defines deeply rooted beliefs about women’s social and biological roles”).
80. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196 (1973).
81. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783.
82. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (“The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 878–79 (retaining Roe’s life and health exceptions, using both “woman” and “mother,”
and reaffirming Roe’s viability-related holding).
85. Id. at 872–73; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After
Casey and Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 675, 681 (2004).
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures
designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the
woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.”).
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more—to do with preserving an individual’s interest in building intimate
87
relationships than in an individual’s interest in sex in and of itself. Even
as it discussed Casey, Lawrence tied the right to engage in homosexual
88
conduct to “persons in a homosexual relationship.” In Gonzales,
however, the relationship at issue turned from one between adults to one
between the pregnant woman and her fetus, directly implicating
motherhood.
Gonzales linked women’s sexuality to the rights of the fetus and
89
thus propelled women toward motherhood. Gonzales imbues the sexual
act itself with the intent to parent: it warns women, addressing them as
mothers, that they may regret ending “the infant life they once created
and sustained” and cautioned that the woman’s health may suffer from a
90
decision to abort. This so-called “fetal personhood” rhetoric implies
that, once conceived, a fetus is a separate person with rights, thus, it has a
91
mother. Women are told that they “should become instantaneously
92
‘motherly’ from the moment of conception.” This contributes to what
some call “maternal-fetal conflict,” the purported clash of rights between
93
a pregnant woman and the fetus. Thus, women remain desexualized,
purportedly destined to be mothers and expected to behave as such. If
the State “couldn’t stop growing numbers of women from climbing into
the sexual driver’s seat, they could at least make the women’s drive more
dangerous—by jamming the reproductive controls,” and courts facilitate
94
that move.

87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“The statutes do seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”); Kaplan, supra note 2 (arguing
that Lawrence was less about sex and more about relationships).
88. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74 (emphasis added).
89. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
90. Id. Researchers have questioned the Court’s implication that women who have an abortion
suffer from mental health problems as a result. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and LongTerm Mental Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 Contraception 436, 445–49
(2008) (finding that high-quality research has suggested few if any negative mental health differences
between women who have and have not had abortions).
91. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate,
18 Colum J. Gender & L. 551, 562 (2009).
92. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion And Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and
Reproductive Freedom 341 (rev. ed. 1990); see Hill, supra note 54, at 663–64.
93. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 Indiana L.J.
667, 688–95 (2006). For an extensive discussion of the regulation of pregnancy, see Ikemoto, Code of
Perfect Pregnancy, supra note 21.
94. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women 405 (1991).
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B. Sluts or Mothers: “Pre-Pregnant” Women, Desexualization,
95
and Obamacare
Sex conjures notions of unbridled passion but also of unconstrained
96
power, especially when it comes to women having sex for pleasure. By
using contraceptives, sexually active women gain some measure of legal
autonomy by exhibiting power over their bodies and lives. However,
there is a growing backlash against access to contraceptives, which
reflects the view that “real women have babies”: they do not have sex for
pleasure, which requires contraceptives; they only have sex for
97
procreation, which does not. As these laws become more entrenched,
women will continue to be desexualized through contraception policy,
litigation, and regulation.
Ninety-nine percent of sexually active women use contraception at
some point in their lives, making its use “virtually universal” in the
98
United States. More specifically, a survey of women conducted between
2006 and 2008 found that eighty-two percent of women have used oral
contraceptives and ten percent have used emergency contraceptives—
more than double the proportion of women who had used emergency
99
contraceptives in 2002. According to the Guttmacher Institute, the
“typical American woman” who wants two children must use some
100
The connection
mechanism of contraception for three decades.
between contraception and women’s health, broadly defined, is clear:
contraceptives reduce maternal mortality and improve maternal-fetal
101
outcomes by preventing unplanned pregnancies. Contraceptives also

95. See January W. Payne, Forever, Wash. Post (May 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/15/AR2006051500875.html (discussing the treatment of women as
“pre-pregnant”); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
96. Cossman, supra note 70, at 24–25 (stating that “patrolling the borders” of when sex is and is not
legitimate still took place after Roe); Klein, supra note 7, at 3; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783 (“As
long as a woman’s sexuality remains in the family sphere and is channeled to procreation, it receives full
legitimacy. When her sexuality is ‘uncontrolled’ it is seen as illegitimate and is criticized and penalized.”).
97. Valenti, supra note 25, at 151–52.
98. Mosher & Jones, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that nearly one hundred percent of sexually
active women ages fifteen to forty-four surveyed from 2006 to 2008 who have ever had intercourse
with a man have at some point in their lifetime used contraceptives, natural or artificial).
99. Id.
100. Rachel Benson Gold et al., Guttmacher Inst., Next Steps for America’s Family
Planning Program: Leveraging the Potential of Medicaid and Title X in an Evolving Health
Care System 6 (2009).
101. Marcia P. Harrigan & Suzanne M. Baldwin, Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, in
Dimensions of Human Behavior: The Changing Life Course 53, 56–57 (Elizabeth D. Hutchinson
ed., 2d ed. 2003); see Kenneth R. Weiss, Contraception Key to Reducing Child, Maternal Deaths,
Experts Say, L.A. Times (July 12, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sncontraception-key-to-reducing-child-maternal-deaths-experts-say-20130712,0,1549550.story.
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have numerous other health benefits for women, including protection
102
against certain cancers.
The morality of contraception—or of sex for pleasure—resurfaced
dramatically recently due to the ACA mandate requiring “women’s
preventive health care—such as mammograms, screenings for cervical
cancer, prenatal care, and other services—generally must be covered by
health plans with no cost sharing” including “[c]ontraceptive methods
103
and counseling.” This mandate infuriated some employers and state
governments, which alleged that the mandate violated religious freedom
by forcing some employers not qualified for a religious exemption under
the ACA to cover health services—such as contraceptives—that conflict
104
with their faith. Implicit in the objections is the notion that sex for
pleasure should not be subsidized, suggesting that sex for procreation is
105
the only appropriate type of sex. President Obama later offered
compromises concerning the contraception mandate, attempting to
assuage employers’ concerns, though those compromises did little to
106
avert litigation over the validity of the ACA.

102. Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves 225 (2011) [hereinafter
Our Bodies, Ourselves].
103. See Health Resources & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Women’s
Preventive Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see also
Remarks by the President on Preventive Care (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/02/10/remarks-president-preventive-care. For a collection of news articles on
healthcare reform, see also Health Care Reform, N.Y. Times (Times Topics),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_care/
health_care_reform/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
104. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 N.W. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 151
(2012); 7 States Sue Over Obama Administration’s Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-23/states-sue-obama-birthcontrol/53228212/1; Warren Richey, Obama Administration Backs Out of Appeal Over New
Contraceptive Mandate, Christian Sci. Monitor (May 6, 2013, 8:58 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2013/0506/Obama-administration-backs-out-of-appeal-over-new-contraceptive-mandatevideo; HHS Mandate Information Central, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (identifying 67 cases and
more than 200 plaintiffs). The type of contraceptive objected to varies. FAQs: Becket Fund’s Lawsuits
Against HHS, Becket Fund For Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/faq/#f5 (last visited
Oct. 23 2013) (“Although many of these institutions do not have objections to traditional
contraception, all are opposed to abortion-inducing drugs, such as the ‘morning after pill’ and ‘week
after pill.’”)
105. Certainly, some women who use contraceptives are already mothers in that they have given
birth to children. The analysis applies to these women, too, as they may be attempting to prevent
additional pregnancies.
106. Morgan Whitaker, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Mandate to Accommodate Religious Groups,
MSNBC.com (Feb. 1, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/01/obama-clarifies-contraceptionmandate-to-accomodate-religious-groups; see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130-131 (2013) (outlining the
requirements for a “religious employer”).
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On one hand, the ACA contraception mandate can be seen as the
quintessential government recognition that women do have sex for
pleasure—and should be able to have sex for pleasure—without suffering
from undesired consequences. The pushback on the ACA by other
government actors, employers, media pundits, states, and individual
lawmakers, however, emphasizes the vast the disapproval of women’s
107
non-procreative sexuality. One prime example: Sandra Fluke.
Fluke, then a law student at Georgetown University, was scheduled
to testify before Congress on the importance of contraceptive coverage
but was refused by the United States House Committee on Oversight
108
and Government Reform. She later testified before a panel of House
109
Democrats. Her testimony was followed by comments from media
personality Rush Limbaugh:
What does it say about the college coed Susan Fluke [sic], who goes
before a congressional committee and essentially says that she must be
paid to have sex? What does that make her? It makes her a slut, right?
It makes her a prostitute. She wants to be paid to have sex. She’s
having so much sex she can’t afford the contraception. She wants you
and me and the taxpayers to pay her to have sex. What does that make
110
us? We’re the pimps.

By lobbying for contraceptive coverage, Fluke was “happily
presenting herself as an immoral, baseless, no-purpose-to-her life
woman;” attending an elite law school and becoming a lawyer was not a
legitimate life purpose for a woman, and, if there was any legitimacy in
that endeavor, the potential of any woman to have non-procreative sex
111
overshadowed her accomplishments. Fluke was forced into the role of
mother-in-waiting because she was assumed to be sexually active. And,
the only legitimate “purpose to her life,” if she had sex, would be to
procreate.
Limbaugh may have been the most famous talking head to address
the contraception mandate, and his comments were histrionic at best, but

107. See infra notes 114–116.
108. Alexa Keyes, Contraception Controversy Continues: Meet Witness Sandra Fluke, ABC News
(Feb. 23, 2012, 2:34 PM) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/contraception-controversycontinues-meet-witness-sandra-fluke.
109. Id.
110. Media Matters Staff, Limbaugh: Student Denied Spot at Contraception Hearing Says “She
Must Be Paid to Have Sex,” So She’s A “Slut” and “Prostitute”, Media Matters for Am. (Feb. 29,
2012,
2:46 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/video/2012/02/29/limbaugh-student-denied-spot-atcontraception-h/186411 (providing a recording and transcript of Rush Limbaugh’s comments about
Sandra Fluke).
111. Media Matters Staff, UPDATED: Limbaugh’s Misogynistic Attack On Georgetown Law
Student Continues With Increased Vitriol, Media Matters for Am. (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:26 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/01/updated-limbaughs-misogynistic-attack-on-george/184248
(providing summary and recording of Rush Limbaugh’s comments).
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he is far from the only prominent person to publically decry the law.
Company after company, school after school, state after state, and
lawmaker after lawmaker fought contraceptive coverage, even directly
112
challenging the value of sex for pleasure. Former presidential candidate
Rick Santorum, the state of Nebraska, Hobby Lobby, and Domino’s
113
Pizza are just a few.
Regardless of whether the asserted sexual authority of the religious
right trumps the autonomy of women as the ACA winds its way through
the courts, any failure to cover contraceptives—and, therefore, recognize
sexuality—contributes to women’s desexualization in society. These
attacks thus buttress entrenchment of desexualization by the State by
eliminating resources that would allow women the ability to avoid or
delay motherhood. This is the essence of desexualization.
The ACA controversy demonstrates that desexualization and its
114
relationship with law and public policy begins long before pregnancy.
But the contraception mandate controversy is merely a gateway to how
law and policy express desexualization. Desexualization intensifies as a
tool for transforming women into mothers when women have already
had sex and are dealing with a potential consequence: pregnancy.
C. Motherhood the Morning After
Women trying to avoid pregnancy can use pre-intercourse
contraceptives, some without a prescription and some, including oral
115
contraceptives, with a prescription. There are also oral, post-coital
contraceptives, sometimes called emergency contraception, the morning116
after pill, or the brand names “Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.”
112. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 104 (detailing lawsuits filed over the ACA
mandate); Irin Carmon, Rick Santorum is Coming for Your Birth Control, Salon (Jan. 4, 2012,
6:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/01/04/rick_santorum_is_coming_for_your_birth_control.
113. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14,
2013); Bruning v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 877 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (D. Neb. 2012); Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1000, 2013 WL 3869832, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013); Terry
Baynes, U.S. Court Accepts Challenge to Obama Contraception Rule, Reuters (June 28, 2013, 2:07 AM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-hobby-lobby-contraception-idINBRE95Q15N20130627; see
also, Carmon, supra note 112.
114. Preventative care is sometimes referred to as “[p]reconception and interconception care,”
which are “health care services and supports that are provided prior to a pregnancy . . . designed to
assure that women are healthy before conception in order to improve pregnancy-related outcomes.”
Carolyn Mullen, The Affordable Care Act and Preconception Health, Pulse 9–10, Nov. 2011, available
at http://www.amchp.org/AboutAMCHP/Newsletters/Pulse/Documents/Pulse_November11.pdf.
115. Planned Parenthood, Birth Control Pills, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/healthtopics/birth-control/birth-control-pill-4228.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (reporting that pills cost as
much as $50 per month and a medical exam prior to getting them, at a cost of up to $250, may be
necessary).
116. There are numerous types of emergency contraceptives. See Types of Emergency
Contraception, The Emergency Contraception Website, http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/brands-
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Recently, some emergency contraceptives were made available without a
117
prescription, but availability was restricted on the basis of age. Efforts
to make some emergency contraceptives available without a prescription
and without age restrictions carried on for years and only recently
118
achieved some success.
Emergency contraception does not implicate motherhood or
119
maternal health: there is no “mother” involved. The concept of
“maternal” health generally, and abortion more specifically, should have
no bearing on the regulation of emergency contraceptives, which
120
prevent—not end—pregnancy. Yet as the controversies surrounding
the availability of emergency contraceptives show, engaging in
intercourse may signal that a woman has accepted the role of mother,
even as she tries to prevent motherhood.
121
Similar to pre-coital contraceptives, emergency contraceptives
122
prevent pregnancy by stopping ovulation. Emergency contraceptives

usa.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (providing information from the Office of Population Research at
Princeton University and the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals on various types of
oral emergency contraceptives); Copper-T IUD as Emergency Contraception, The Emergency
Contraception Website, http://ec.princeton.edu/info/eciud.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (describing
the use of an IUD as emergency contraception). Emergency contraception or contraceptives in this
Article refers to oral emergency contraception or contraceptives. See Emergency Contraception State
Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legislators, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/
emergency-contraception-state-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 2012) (discussing state emergency
contraception regulations, including dispensing by pharmacists).
117. See News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency
Contraceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential (June 20,
2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm
[hereinafter FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription] (saying Plan B One-Step was
approved in 2009 for use by women age seventeen and over; the age was lowered to fifteen in April
2013).
118. Id. (approving Plan B One-Step for all women on a non-prescription basis); Tummino v.
Hamburg, Memorandum, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 2631163, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (discussing
levonorgestrel-based contraceptives).
119. See Mother Definition, supra note 10.
120. How Emergency Contraception Works, The Emergency Contraception Website,
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecabt.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
121. FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“The product contains
higher levels of a hormone found in some types of daily use oral hormonal contraceptive pills and
works in a similar way to these contraceptive pills by stopping ovulation and therefore preventing
pregnancy.”). For general information on oral contraceptives, see FAQ: Birth Control Pills, Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (Mar. 2013), http://www.acog.org/~/media /For%20Patients/
faq021.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2102509049.
122. Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, N.Y. Times (June
5,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/health/research/morning-after-pills-dont-blockimplantation-science-suggests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (asserting that the debate over how
emergency contraceptives work has been largely resolved and that it is not an abortifacient, but
discussing contrary views).
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must be taken quickly after intercourse in order to maximize efficacy.
Although some anti-reproductive-rights advocates argue that emergency
contraceptives may prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus,
scientists say there is no evidence that emergency contraceptives function
124
in that capacity. In other words, studies—and the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”)—contend that emergency contraceptives do
125
not end an established pregnancy. Still, some argue that emergency
contraceptives are abortifacients. For example, the American Right to
Life organization says that “the greatest danger of the ‘Morning After
126
Pill’ is that it is designed to kill a child.”
In addition to the initial, prescription-only status of emergency
contraceptives, access to the medications has been restricted in other
ways. The federal government, until recently, restricted availability based
127
on age. Additionally, pharmacists—and perhaps even others—may be
allowed to refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives.
The sexuality of young women is perhaps the most feared sexuality
128
of all as, in most cases, it is overtly sex for pleasure. It can also have
129
massive, unintended ramifications in terms of unplanned pregnancy.

123. FAQ: Emergency Contraception, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists(Aug. 2011),
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq114.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2106435514.
124. Id.; Belluck, supra note 122.
125. See FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“Plan B One-Step
will not stop a pregnancy when a woman is already pregnant and there is no medical evidence that the
product will harm a developing fetus.”); Belluck, supra note 122 (citing Mayo Clinic physicians,
National Institutes of Health, and International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics officials as
saying emergency contraception does not work post-fertilization).
126. Plan B Side Effect On Younger and Younger Girls, Am. Right to Life,
http://americanrtl.org/news/plan-b-side-effect-daughters (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see Elizabeth
Shadigian, Letter to the FDA Regarding Over-The-Counter Status For Plan B, Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life
Obstetricians
&
Gynecologists,
http://www.aaplog.org/position-and-papers/emergencycontraception/letter-to-the-fda-regarding-over-the-counter-status-for-plan-b (last visited Oct. 6, 2013)
(“Plan B’s labeling does not give adequate notice to a potential user that Plan B may prevent the
implantation of a human embryo (e.g., a fertilized ovum) as one mechanism of action, thus acting as an
abortifacient.”); Plan B [Emergency Abortion Pill] FAQs, Pharmacists for Life Int’l,
http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli=planbfaq (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
127. See Plan B: Questions and Answers, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm109783.htm (last updated
Dec. 14, 2006) (announcing Plan B approval over-the-counter for women eighteen years and older).
128. See generally Sinikka Elliott, Not My Kid: What Parents Believe About the Sex Lives of
Their Teenagers (2012) (discussing the disconnect between actual sexual activity and parental
perceptions of it); Amy T. Schalet, Not Under My Roof: Parents, Teens, and the Culture of Sex
(2011) (comparing U.S. attitudes toward teen sex with other countries); Deborah L. Tolman,
Dilemmas of Desire: Teenage Girls Talk about Sexuality (2002) (discussing fear over girls’
sexuality); Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing the harm girls face from lacking a
comprehensive understanding of sexuality); In Brief: Fact Sheet, Facts on American Teens’ Sexual and
Reproductive Health, Guttmacher Inst. (June 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FBATSRH.html (reporting that fewer than two percent of adolescents younger than twelve are sexually
active, sixteen percent by age fifteen, one-third by age sixteen, and that 750,000 teens between fifteen
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In 2011, Department of Health and Human Services Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius refused to follow the guidance of FDA staff, who
recommended that Plan B One-Step be made more widely available to
130
She rejected the
young women without a prescription.
recommendations of her own agency and said that there was insufficient
proof that young women could understand how to use the drug or the
131
consequences of its use. Ultimately, her actions were called “obviously
political” by a federal district court judge, who ordered the FDA to
“make levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives available without
132
a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions.”
Eventually, after the Second Circuit denied in part the government’s
request for a stay pending appeal, the Obama administration capitulated:
Plan B One-Step was made available without a prescription or point-ofsale restrictions regardless of a woman’s age (assuming that a woman can
133
afford it and is not otherwise obstructed from accessing it).

and nineteen years old get pregnant each year). A minor’s right to access contraceptives has long been
controversial, as is seen in the fragmented decision in Carey v. Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), and discussed in Angela Patterson, Carey v. Population Services International: Minors’
Right to Access Contraceptives, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 469 (2004); see also State Policies in Brief,
Minors’
Access
to
Contraceptive
Services,
Guttmacher
Inst.
(Aug. 1,
2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf.
129. Teen
Pregnancy
Prevention,
Nat’l
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/teen-pregnancy-prevention.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2013)
(“Teenage mothers are less likely to finish high school and are more likely than their peers to live in
poverty, depend on public assistance, and be in poor health. Their children are more likely to suffer
health and cognitive disadvantages, come in contact with the child welfare and correctional systems,
live in poverty, drop out of high school and become teen parents themselves. According to the
National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, the annual public cost of teen
childbearing—due to higher costs of public health care, foster care, incarceration and lost tax
revenue—is nearly $11 billion.”).
130. News Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2011pres/12/20111207a.html [hereinafter Sebelius Statement] (using the terms “Plan B
One-Step”, “emergency contraceptive,” and “morning after pill” in the release).
131. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret
Hamburg, M.D., on Plan B One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/ucm282805.htm [hereinafter Hamburg Statement]; Sebelius Statement, supra note 130;
Sam Baker, Left ‘Speechless’ as Sebelius Overrules FDA on Access to Morning-After Pill, The Hill
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/abortion/197825-sebelius-overrules-fda-blocksaccess-to-plan-b (discussing the notion that the secretary “bow[ed] to political pressure” and ignored
her own agency’s scientists); HHS Overrules FDA, Limiting Plan B for Teens Under 17, USA Today
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/healthcare/health/healthcare/story/2011-1207/FDA-debates-over-the-counter-morning-after-pill/51699388/1.
132. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *7, *31 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013).
This was not the first time the district court noted political interference in emergency contraception
regulation. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering the FDA to
make Plan B available to women age 17 without a prescription).
133. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 13-1690, 2013 WL 2435370, at *1 (2d Cir. June 5, 2013) (“Insofar
as the district court order requires Appellants to immediately provide over-the-counter access to the
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Obstructions, however, are likely; despite the non-prescription status and
lack of age restrictions for Plan B One-Step, pharmacists have already
said they may continue to keep it behind the counter and limit access by
134
age.
From a policy perspective, the regulation of emergency
contraception for minors exposes a paradox. If we break down
desexualization, we see that it involves two steps: (1) a shaming of sex for
pleasure, and (2) a push toward motherhood. The first move of
135
desexualization may seem appropriate when it comes to young women.
However, taking the second step and pushing young women toward
motherhood is counterintuitive. Once unprotected sex has occurred,
opponents of non-prescription emergency contraceptives for younger
women appear to fear the possibility of promiscuity among young
women more than they fear teen pregnancy, even though studies show
the availability of emergency contraceptives does not increase sexual
136
activity. This is remarkable; once they have sex, young women were—
and arguably still are—pushed toward motherhood seemingly as a
punishment either for failure to use contraceptives or for being sexually
137
active at all. This is desexualization. Whether young or not, women are
not to have sex for pleasure and, if they do, they are deemed to have
accepted the role of mother, no matter their age.
Government actions to limit the availability of emergency
contraceptives propel women toward motherhood and do so without
providing health information related to pregnancy. Sebelius, for

one-pill variants of emergency contraceptives, a stay, pending appeal, is granted. Insofar as the order
mandates immediate over-the-counter access to the two-pill variants of emergency contraceptives, a
stay is denied because the Appellants have failed to meet the requisite standard.”). FDA Approves
Plan B One-Step Without a Prescription, supra note 117; Letter from U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y. Loretta
E. Lynch to Hon. Edward R. Korman (June 10, 2013), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/
2013/jun/justiceletter.pdf (asserting that the government had complied with the Court’s prior judgment
and that the FDA “will not at this time take steps” to change the status of other emergency
contraceptives). For information regarding the regulatory status of other contraceptives, see Where
Should EC Be? FDA-Approved Emergency Contraceptive Products as of August 1, 2013, Reprod.
Health
Techs.
Project,
http://www.rhtp.org/contraception/emergency/documents/
WhereShouldECBe.August12013.pdf.
134. Meeri Kim, Questions About Effect of Over-The-Counter Plan B for All Ages, Wash. Post
(June 29, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-29/national/40268209_1_emergencycontraception-plan-b-one-step-age-restrictions.
135. But see Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6, at 9–10 (arguing that the focus on virginity
discourages girls from safe expressions of sexuality).
136. Klein, supra note 7, at 38; see Carey v. Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694–95
(1977) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)). But see Editorial: Docs Push Plan B:
Putting Girls’ Health at Risk to Prevent Pregnancy, Wash. Times (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/29/docs-push-plan-b.
137. See supra note 136. See generally Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing how girls
are taught to fear their sexuality).
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example, said that young girls might not understand the Plan B One-Step
138
label, justifying limitations on its availability. Her actions suggested
that young women could not make good health decisions related to
contraception, but at the same time, young women’s ability to make good
health decisions related to pregnancy—which carries with it health risks,
too—were not discussed in her statement, thus undermining any
argument that the Plan B One-Step restriction was intended as a health
139
protection. Her invocation of girls’ health to deny access to emergency
contraceptives was particularly disingenuous given that the drug was still
140
available to girls by prescription. According to prominent physicians,
“[a]ny objective review makes it clear that Plan B is more dangerous to
141
politicians than to adolescent girls.” We will see this misleading use of
women’s health against women’s autonomy again in the context of
142
abortion and cesarean sections.
Moreover, some states have enacted laws that allow some
healthcare providers to deny women access to reproductive health
143
services. These laws were first passed in response to Roe and allow
medical providers, among other actions, to refuse to dispense drugs that
144
may conflict with their moral or religious beliefs. Changes in the way
that emergency contraceptives are dispensed may lessen the potential
impact of pharmacist refusal. However, opportunities for pharmacists
and other employees of retailers that sell Plan B One-Step to obstruct
145
access will undoubtedly still exist.

138. Compare Hamburg Statement, supra note 131 (“[Plan B One-Step] was safe and effective in
adolescent females, that adolescent females understood the product was not for routine use, and that
the product would not protect them against sexually transmitted diseases. Additionally, the data
supported a finding that adolescent females could use Plan B One-Step properly without the
intervention of a healthcare provider.”), with Sebelius Statement, supra note 130 (“the actual use
study and the label comprehension study are not sufficient to support making Plan B One-Step
available to all girls 16 and younger, without talking to a health care professional.”); Ikemoto, The
Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 766.
139. See generally Heidi Murkoff & Sharon Mazel, What to Expect When You’re Expecting
(2008) (discussing various health risks women face when pregnant).
140. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013).
141. Alastair J.J. Wood et al., The Politics of Emergency Contraception, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 101,
102 (2012).
142. See infra Part III.
143. State “conscience clause” laws allow medical providers to deny healthcare services based on
their individual beliefs. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses Laws and Information, Nat’l Conference of
State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/pharmacist-conscience-clauses-lawsand-information.aspx (last updated May 2012); State Policies in Brief, Refusing to Provide Health
Services, Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_RPHS.pdf.
144. Id.; see Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51, at 114–22.
145. Kim, supra note 134.
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Refusing to dispense emergency contraceptives is tantamount to
declaring a sexually active woman to be “pregnant,” and thus a mother,
146
the instant she has sex. Women are explicitly desexualized through
these clauses. When healthcare providers refuse to dispense emergency
contraceptives, they push women toward motherhood, often with State
147
support.
Whether expressed by a private employer or by a government
official, desexualization is identifiable in the law. When it came to the
ACA, we saw desexualization by public and private actors challenging
the mandated coverage of contraceptives. In terms of emergency
contraception, we see desexualization in the actions of regulatory
officials. In both contexts, desexualization is used to propel women
toward motherhood. As a consequence, women are impliedly told prior
to intercourse that sex is only sanctioned if it is done for the purposes of
becoming a parent, thus further facilitating the legal regulation of sexual
and reproductive decisionmaking.

III. The Curious Disappearance of the Pregnant
Woman: Using
148
Rituals to Promote Motherhood
Motherhood is treated as a “female rite of passage” that marks a
149
woman’s value and status. For a woman, rejecting motherhood is
150
tantamount to rejecting her core societal role. Using contraceptives is
counter to the role women are supposed to play.
Whether a woman seeks to end a pregnancy or to continue it,
desexualization continues through the regulation of women’s sexual and

146. Id. See Pharmacy Refusals 101, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/pharmacy-refusals-101 (“In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a mother of six went
to her local Walgreens with a prescription for emergency contraception. The pharmacist refused to fill
the prescription and berated the mother in the pharmacy’s crowded waiting area, shouting ‘You’re a
murderer! I will not help you kill this baby . . . .’ She subsequently became pregnant and had an
abortion.”).
147. Some people even feel so strongly that all sex is procreative that they think women who are
sexually assaulted should welcome the role of motherhood even if it is—literally—forced up on them.
John Avlon, GOP Policy is the Scandal, Not Just Akin’s Comments, CNN (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/opinion/avlon-akin-gop/index.html; Mark Memmott, “God Intended”
A Pregnancy Caused by Rape, Indiana Candidate Says, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:15 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/10/24/163529166/god-intended-a-pregnancy-caused-byrape-indiana-candidate-says. But see Goldstein, supra note 12, at 13 (saying that rape victims may not
be expected to take on the mothering role because they did not consent to having sex).
148. Another area of ritualization is infertility treatment. For an exploration of the relationship
between abortion jurisprudence and assisted reproductive technology, see generally Burkstrand-Reid,
The More Things Change, supra note 68, and Jody Lyneé Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting
Infertile Women’s Decision-Making Autonomy, 71 Md. L. Rev. 339 (2012).
149. Martha McMahon, Engendering Motherhood: Identity and Self-Transformation in
Women’s Lives 108 (1995).
150. Id. at 231.
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reproductive health. After all, a less-sexual woman may be seen as a
152
better mother. But being pregnant does not necessarily mean that one
will become a “mother,” let alone the good, all-sacrificing mother that
society demands. Manufacturing mothers after conception also requires
what this Article calls ritualization: first, making pregnant women
seeking an abortion participate in the same medical rituals that women
continuing pregnancies are directed to undertake, and second, for
women who decide to continue their pregnancy, using their participation
or lack of participation in certain rituals to indicate whether they will be
“good mothers.” Desexualization and ritualization work in tandem in
reproductive health law to cast women as mothers.
A. Locating and Defining Ritualization
“Good motherhood” is derived from a cultural script telling women
153
how to be mothers. This script requires women to relegate their
154
sexuality to the periphery. Rituals bring women into the norms of
155
pregnancy and motherhood. Women may be coerced into participating
in what are typically treated in continuing pregnancies as bonding rituals
156
associated with “good motherhood.” In the context of abortion, by
requiring women to interact with providers multiple times or see an
157
ultrasound, the law tries to compel them to accept the role of mother.
Likewise, women are told by society and the legal system that to be a
“good mother” they must participate in a medicalized birth and may be
158
legally punished if they do not.

151. Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite of Passage 61 (2003).
152. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99.
153. McMahon, supra note 149, at 27.
154. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 366; Tardy, supra note 6, at 462–63.
155. Lisa M. Mitchell, Baby’s First Picture: Ultrasound and the Politics of Fetal Subjects
174 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1181, 1181, 1189–90
(2005) (“Rituals . . . speak to people’s core emotions and reveal values that a society holds dearest.
Because their expression is conventional and obligatory, they join the individual in solidarity with the
group. . . . Rituals are enacted at key transitions in a person’s life when he or she is likely to be
receptive to influences on identity. These transitions include life crises such as . . . pregnancy,
parenthood, or death of a loved one. People are likely to be more receptive to influence in these
situations because the circumstances tend to be charged with emotion and because these are occasions
where identities are changing.”).
156. See generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 351, 382–83 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and Believing].
There are countless rituals in the medicalized birthing process today. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at
73–153 (listing, for example, the use of wheelchairs, separation from partners, use of hospital gowns
instead of personal clothing, enemas, hospital beds, and fasting).
157. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83.
158. The regulation of aspects of reproductive health is part of the “medicalized . . . need to
protect women.” Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 752; see infra
Part II.B.; Valenti, supra note 25, at 158–61. The government extensively regulates the behavior of
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This Part examines how ritualization underpins the regulation of
pregnant women’s sexual and reproductive health decisionmaking and
159
thus undermines women’s autonomy once a woman is pregnant.
Ritualization occurs both in the context of abortion and in the context of
a continuing pregnancy, from prenatal care to childbirth. In both, we see
examples of how Roe and its progeny have been mobilized to facilitate
the State’s purported interest in “maternal” health and fetal life, which
160
thinly veils how the law pushes women toward motherhood.
The number and type of abortion-related laws are extensive and
161
continue to increase. Some of these laws contain an insidious aspect:
they replicate the rituals of prenatal care but with the goal of stopping
women from exercising their right to have an abortion. Examples of
common abortion laws that both limit access to abortion care and
replicate prenatal care are forced ultrasounds, biased counseling, and
mandatory delay laws, which operate together to ritualize abortion
services.
1.

Forced Ultrasounds

162

Perhaps the most powerful ritual in a continuing pregnancy is
displayed on a screen and subsequently carried in the pockets and purses
of mothers-to-be. This is the ultrasound, the first visual representation of

pregnant women when it comes to drug use. See, e.g., Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving
Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 381, 386–92 (2008) (examining state responses to “the perceived problem of drug use
by pregnant women”).
159. Using abortion jurisprudence to directly or implicitly justify intervention in women’s
reproductive lives is a “serious distortion” of Roe. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions:
What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women’s L.J. 9, 15 (1987); see Kim Shayo Buchanan,
Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 Emory L.J. 1235, 1291 (2007) (“[T]he courts
of appeals of two circuits have imported the ‘undue burden’ standard to adjudicate the equal
protection rights of pregnant women in cases that have nothing to do with any countervailing state
interest in protecting fetal life.”).
160. Roe is cited in reproductive and sexual health cases outside of the abortion context. See, e.g.,
Carey v. Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685–90 (1977); Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in
Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987); Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d
Cir. 1995); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women
in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. Health
Pol. Pol’y & L. 299, 325 (2013).
161. States Enact a Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in 2011, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 5,
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html.
162. Elective cesarean sections are beyond the scope of this Article. For points of view on this
procedure, see Veronique Bergeron, The Ethics of Cesarean Section on Maternal Request: A Feminist
Critique of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Position on Patient-Choice
Surgery, 21 Bioethics 478, 482–84 (2007); Gene Declercq & Judy Norsigian, Mothers Aren’t Behind A
Vogue for Caesareans, Boston Globe (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/women/
articles/2006/04/03/mothers_arent_behind_a_vogue_for_caesareans.
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a fetus. Ultrasounds have become a rite of passage for a pregnant
164
woman. This prenatal ritual is one of many legal tools that antireproductive-rights advocates use to push women seeking abortions
165
toward motherhood.
Ultrasound use is virtually unregulated in the United States, and the
research on the safety and efficacy for both the pregnant woman and
166
fetus is limited. Even in a continuing pregnancy, ultrasounds are
167
medically indicated only in limited circumstances. Ultrasounds in a
continuing pregnancy can be used to confirm that the pregnancy is
viable, determine the date of gestation and the number of fetuses, and to
168
determine whether there may be problems with the fetus. During the
ultrasound process, women may hear a fetal heartbeat and may leave
their provider’s office with a printout of a bean-sized image to share with
169
friends and family. Despite the popularity of this ritual, the ultrasound
process and resulting “picture” are misleading; especially early in
pregnancy, it is likely that “the ultrasound image has been magnified and
170
the heartbeat amplified.” Studies show that most couples need help
171
even interpreting the fetal image. So why is that black-and-white
printout so powerful? Quite simply: the act of holding that picture
172
defines the holder as a parent.
There are limited medical reasons to require an ultrasound for a
173
Some providers perform ultrasounds
first-trimester abortion.

163. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law,
100 Calif. L. Rev. 269, 282 (2012).
164. Id. at 282.
165. Sanger, supra note 163, at 301–02.
166. Compare, Ina May Gaskin, Ina May’s Guide to Childbirth 191 (2003), with Murkoff &
Mazel supra note 139.
167. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191. But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing sonograms as “routine measures in pregnancy
medicine today” and “‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus”).
168. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 60; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191.
169. Forming a Bond with Your Baby—Why It isn’t Always Immediate, WebMD (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/forming-a-bond-with-your-baby-why-it-isnt-always-immediate
(“[Bonding] begins to happen even before the baby is bornwhen you feel the first little flutters in
your belly or see your baby kick on the ultrasound screen.”); Kukla, supra note 25, at 70–74
(describing ultrasounds as being “social” events).
170. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, Ala. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), at *45,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258742.
171. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 5.
172. 10 Ways to Bond With Your Bump, Babycentre (last updated Oct. 2011),
http://www.babycentre.co.uk/a1049630/10-ways-to-bond-with-your-bump#ixzz2GwTNBzGD (“Having
a picture of your baby’s scan on your phone or on your fridge door is a constant reminder that your
bump is home to a little person.”).
173. Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in
Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 359, 380 (2009); 2011 Clinical Policy Guidelines, Nat’l
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voluntarily, however, while others are forced by law to either perform
174
them or to give information about them prior to providing an abortion.
Regardless of whether the ultrasound is mandated by law or performed
at the direction of the provider, ultrasounds push women toward
motherhood.
Some states do not require a provider to perform an ultrasound but
require providers to offer to display the ultrasound screen if one is
175
performed. In some states, the law forces a woman seeking an abortion
to have an ultrasound—regardless of her or the provider’s wishes—and
176
may require the provider to offer to show the image to the woman.
State laws with the most “force” require providers to perform an
177
ultrasound, display the image, and describe what is on the screen,
presumably on the patriarchal assumption that women having an
178
abortion have not thought their choice through.
Ultrasound laws are often veiled in medical terms and are described
179
as a type of “informed consent.” Informed consent in medicine,
generally, is designed to be a health protection for patients, but the use
of ultrasounds and the required dialogue surrounding their use prior to
180
abortion is intended to push women toward motherhood. Even if
forced ultrasounds are constitutionally permissible, their purported
constitutionality does not make them any more medically necessary or
181
any less political.
Mandating ultrasounds in the context of abortion care uses a major
ritual of a continuing pregnancy in an attempt to trigger “maternal”
182
bonding, prompt “maternal” guilt, and prevent abortion. The very
process of getting an ultrasound is part of the ritual of a continuing

Abortion Fed’n, at 9–10 (2011), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/
professional_education/2011%20CPGs.pdf.
174. State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, Guttmacher Inst.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
175. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.561 (West 2008); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2(c) (2010).
176. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2002); Fla. Stat. § 390.0111(3)(a) (2013).
177. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2012). In some circumstances, a woman may
opt to look away or decline to listen. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174.
178. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th
Cir. 2012) (providing the title of the Texas anti-abortion and ultrasound statute—the “Woman’s Right
to Know Act”). However, information that “might cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion” does not in and of itself make a law unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
179. See, e.g., Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 582; La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d) (requiring women to fill out a form indicating that they’ve been given
the opportunity to see the “unborn child” and listen to a heartbeat); Sonia M. Suter, Bad Mothers or
Struggling Mothers?, 42 Rutgers L.J. 695, 700 (2011).
180. Suter, supra note 179, at 700.
181. Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 576.
182. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83.
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pregnancy: the cleaning of the stomach, the movement of the ultrasound
wand, lying down on what may feel like a delivery table, lights dimmed
183
and screen bright. It is in similar circumstances when, later in a
continuing pregnancy, women may find out the sex of the baby and have
the first glimpse of fetal body parts and the twists and turns of the fetus
in utero. As such, the law tries to turn them into mothers; ultrasounds
put the pregnant woman in a place very similar to where she might be in
a much later point in pregnancy, one at which, hypothetically, she has
accepted motherhood. It is a thinly “veiled attempt to personify the fetus
184
and dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion.”
2.

Biased Counseling/Informed Consent and Mandatory
Delay/Waiting Periods

While the use of forced ultrasounds may be the most obvious way
that a ritual of continuing pregnancy is used to push women seeking an
abortion into motherhood, ritualization is used in other ways in the
context of abortion. Although more subtle, some counseling and
informed consent provisions regulating abortion also signify ritualization
185
and further thrust women toward motherhood.
The State may express anti-abortion viewpoints by forcing medical
providers to convey information that goes beyond traditional informed
186
consent requirements. Thirty-five states require that women receive
some type of counseling prior to having an abortion; twenty-seven

183. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 3; Michelle Chen, It’s Not Just Forced Ultrasound: Abortion
Rights Under Assault, Salon (Oct. 21, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/10/21/
its_not_just_forced_ultrasound_abortion_rights_under_assault. Furthermore, given the high
percentage of women having abortions who are already mothers, by replicating the ultrasound ritual,
the law has compelled women to experience a significant ritual in “maternal” healthcare and
“motherhood,” one which they may be familiar with as biological mothers. Lauren Sandler, The
Mother Majority: Women with Children Have More Abortions than Anyone Else, and By an
Increasingly Wide Margin. So Why is the Topic Taboo?, Slate (Oct. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10/most_surprising_abortion_statistic_the_majori
ty_of_women_who_ter.html.
184. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174.
185. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy
of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 4 (2006) (“In some cases,
the state goes so far as to include information that is patently inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence
to the charge that states’ abortion counseling mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women
about the abortion procedure than to discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.”).
186. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (“If the information the
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may
be permissible . . .[R]equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to
fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is
a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion. This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.”).
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specify what the information must include, and that information is often
187
biased or inaccurate. These laws are often described as “informed
consent” laws, a label that disingenuously implies that they replicate the
counseling that takes place before all medical procedures when, in fact,
the information provided goes far beyond that. This is why pro-choice
188
advocates sometimes call them “biased counseling” laws. For example,
South Dakota forces providers to give misleading information that says
189
having an abortion puts women at increased risk of committing suicide.
Wisconsin requires that the materials offered to a woman include
“photographs, pictures or drawings, that are designed to inform the
woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of
190
the unborn child at 2-week gestational increments.” Some states even
provide inaccurate information on the impact an abortion can have on
191
future fertility and the discredited theory that there is a link between
192
abortion and breast cancer.
To understand how biased counseling constitutes ritualization at the
time of an abortion, one must first understand how health care is
delivered during a typical pregnancy. In an ideal prenatal care setting,
when a woman chooses to continue a pregnancy, her interaction with a
medical professional begins immediately. In addition to confirming the
pregnancy, the first visit typically involves the taking of a medical history,
a physical exam, some laboratory tests, a lot of talk about what is to
come in the next several months, and ways for the pregnant woman to
193
stay healthy during the pregnancy.

187. State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, Guttmacher Inst.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion]. Counseling may be oral or written, in person or not. Id;
see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. Rev.
939, 1000–11 (2009) (arguing that women have a right to not listen to abortion-related counseling).
188. See Biased Counseling & Mandatory Delays, NARAL Pro-Choice Am.,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/biased_counseling.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2013) (defining “biased counseling” and “mandatory delay”); see also Counseling and Waiting Periods
for Abortion, supra note 187; Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased
Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1, 6–33 (2012).
189. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 (8th Cir. 2012);
Spurious Science Triumphs as U.S. Court Upholds South Dakota “Suicide Advisory” Law,
Guttmacher Inst. (July 27, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/07/27/index.html
(quoting the American Psychological Association as saying, “the best scientific evidence indicates that
the relative risk of mental health problems among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy is
no greater if they have an elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver the pregnancy”).
190. Wis. Stat. § 253.10 (3)(d)(2) (2012).
191. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187 (listing Arizona, Kansas, North
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia).
192. Id. (listing Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas).
193. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 124–26.
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Biased counseling laws are an attempt to replicate that prominent
194
ritual of pregnancy: visits to a trusted healthcare provider. But abortion
“informed consent” statutes do nothing of the kind; they twist the
woman’s medical confidant into an ideological advocate, whether or not
195
the provider agrees. As a consequence, a woman’s trust in her provider
is used against her.
Admittedly, when a pregnancy is to be terminated, a woman’s
relationship with the provider is more truncated than the relationships
196
women have with their providers in an ongoing pregnancy.
Nonetheless, by requiring biased counseling, the State pushes healthcare
providers to exert power over a woman seeking to end a pregnancy. The
power a practitioner has over a pregnant woman, whether she is ending
197
or continuing her pregnancy, is immense and is badly misused when
counseling is biased, especially when that provider is forced to provide
198
erroneous health information. But biased counseling is not the only
example of ritualization in pregnancy. Mandatory delay laws, which
require time to pass between an initial consultation and the abortion,
also mimic the care provided in a wanted pregnancy.
Monthly visits to a medical provider are one of the rituals of an
199
ongoing pregnancy. The wait between each visit provides time for the
pregnant woman (transformed into a mother) to bond with the fetus and
200
to contemplate motherhood. This process is mirrored to a limited
extent by laws that mandate delay between a woman’s decision to have
an abortion and the procedure itself. In twenty-six states, a woman has to
wait one or more days between the time she seeks an abortion and the
time an abortion is performed, and several states mandate two visits to
201
the abortion provider. A woman terminating a pregnancy is required to
194. Compare id. at 21–32, with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (2012).
195. Richardson & Nash, supra note 185.
196. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (“The vast majority of all abortions are
performed in clinics devoted solely to providing abortions and family planning services. Most women
who seek abortions at these facilities do not have any relationship with the physician who performs the
abortion, before or after the procedure. They do not return to the facility for postsurgical care. In most
instances, the woman’s only actual contact with the physician occurs simultaneously with the abortion
procedure, with little opportunity to receive counseling concerning her decision.”).
197. See, e.g., M.C. Shapiro et al., Information Control and the Exercise of Power in the Obstetrical
Encounter, 17 Soc. Sci. Med. 139, 145 (1983).
198. Vandewalker, supra note 188, at 6–33.
199. See generally Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139 (describing monthly prenatal visits).
200. Id. at 29, 248; Sara Terzo, Analysis: Pro-Life Support for Abortion Waiting Periods and
Informed Consent Saves Lives, Live Action News (Jan. 20, 2013), http://liveactionnews.org/pro-lifesupport-for-abortion-waiting-periods-and-informed-consent-saves-lives.
201. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885–87 (1992) (upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period). Although some
states require a mandatory delay of less than twenty-four hours, the practical impact of the delay is
likely to make the woman have to return to the provider the following day.
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take the time to think about and bond with her “unborn child,” as if she
had not already seriously considered her decision to have an abortion
before going to visit her provider.
Forced ultrasounds, biased counseling, and mandatory delay laws
replicate rituals that take place during the process preceding childbirth
for the purpose of making women accept the role of mother, and thus
impede women’s access to abortion. The information presented to the
woman—via ultrasound, orally, or in writing—is designed to create a
hierarchical relationship with a medical professional who then may be
required to provide information designed to induce women to feel like a
mother through these rituals and create feelings of guilt about choosing
not to be a mother. If a woman does not change her mind, she is rejecting
“a five-thousand-year-old tide of conditioning, of social agendas
propounded by churches and other male-dominated institutions, that say
that a woman’s primary purpose is to have children and to serve her
202
children and her husband.”
B. The Patient Mother
One might think that once a woman accepts the responsibility of
childbirth, the State would cease to intervene. But “choice” is not just
about abortion. Pregnancy and the birth process are filled with a vast
203
number of options regarding how birth will take place. And the law
frequently influences what choices women make as mothers, as we see
through the ritualized practices in the ongoing pregnancy.
In the context of childbirth, ritualization involves a woman engaging
the rituals of a medicalized pregnancy and birth process, primarily the
204
rituals involved in standard obstetric care and hospital birthing.
By ‘medicalizing’ birth, i.e. separating a woman from her own
environment and surrounding her with strange people using strange
machines to do strange things to her in an effort to assist her, the
woman’s state of mind and body is so altered that her way of carrying
through this intimate act must also be altered and the state of the baby
born must equally be altered. The result is that it is no longer possible
to know what births would have been like before these manipulations.
Most health care providers no longer know what ‘non-medicalized’

202. Christiane Northrup, Women’s Bodies, Women’s Wisdom: Creating Physical and
Emotional Health and Healing 388 (2010).
203. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 21–31.
204. This Article asserts that ritualization is reflected in the broader trend of medicalization, the
“process of turning . . . people into patients. . . . It leads people to have too much treatmentand some
of them are harmed by it.” H. Gilbert Welch, Opinion, The Medicalization of Life, L.A. Times
(Mar. 15, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/opinion/la-oe-welch15-2010mar15.
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birth is. The entire modern obstetric and neonatological
literature is
205
essentially based on observations of ‘medicalized’ birth.

Although women can give birth in a variety of settings, they do so
overwhelmingly in hospitals and with physicians, though options for
206
other birth attendants exist. In the United States there is a “veritable
207
mandate” that babies be born in hospitals—and nearly all are. This is
due, in part, to the increasing number of medical technologies that are
presented as necessary for a safe labor process: fetal monitors and
intravenous medicines, among other interventions, are part of the birth
208
ritual. Given all of the technology now available for use during the
labor process, its use is expected; women who refuse modern locations,
modern interventions, or who forsake “scientific” (that is physician)
209
advice risk being seen as selfish, the hallmark of a “bad mother.”
Some degree of medicalization within the narrow relationship
between a pregnant woman and her practitioner is expected. But our
legal regime may go above and beyond the typical provider-patient
relationship by dictating where, how, and with whom women may
210
labor. Why do we see ritualization in the law and social dictates
211
regarding what constitutes a good pregnancy and birth? Is it a symptom
212
of industrialization and our societal obsession with new technologies?
Is it a sign not only of State intervention but also our lawsuit-happy
society, with doctors choosing to intervene rather than assume legal
213
risk? Or might the State’s push to use the rituals of medicalized birth

205. M. Wagner, Fish Can’t See Water: The Need to Humanize Birth, 75 Int’l J. Gynecology &
Obstetrics S25, S26 (2001) (quoting the European Reg’l Office, World Health Org., Having a
Baby in Europe (1985)).
206. Joyce A. Martin et al., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final Data for 2011,
62 Nat’l Vital Statistics Reports 1, 12 (2013).
207. Heather Joy Baker, “We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies:” An Investigation of Maternal Rights
and Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 Women’s Rights L. Rep. 538, 553 (2010); see
supra note 206.
208. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 362–99.
209. See Kukla, supra note 25, at 74 (discussing “birth as a maternal achievement test”); Baker, supra
note 207, at 553. See generally Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision is it
Anyway?, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 591 (1989) (discussing efforts to compel pregnant women to undergo
treatments against their wishes). Blaming the woman for all ills that befall her baby is not new; for
example, people used to believe that “if you looked at ugly things, you’d have an ugly baby.” Tara ParkerPope, Lessons from the History of Childbirth, N.Y. Times (Well) (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:28 AM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/the-history-of-childbirth. For a discussion of the “bad mother” in
law, see generally Marie Ashe, The “Bad Mother” In Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation,
43 Hastings L.J. 1017 (1992).
210. The tort system may impact obstetrical practice. Sheila Kitzinger, The Complete Book of
Pregnancy & Childbirth 56 (2011); Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
211. Jennifer Block, Pushed: The Painful Truth About Childbirth and Modern Maternity
Care 6 (2007); Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
212. Block, supra note 211, at 6, 39–40.
213. Id. at 43; Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
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reflect a distrust of women’s reproductive capacity, a view “of the female
214
body as an inherently defective machine?” The answer is unknown.
The State controls pregnancy and labor by propelling pregnant
women toward a birth marked by a standard set of medical rituals.
Specifically, it adopts laws and allows legal interventions that (1) limit
what type of medical professional can attend childbirth, (2) limit the
locations of birth labor, and (3) limit the methods women use to give
birth. All of these exemplify how women are expected to participate in
the ritualization of pregnancy, the propulsion of those women toward
“good motherhood,” and the consequences to women who do not
215
participate in these rituals.
1.

Attending Birth

Among the most important decisions a woman approaching
childbirth can make is the choice of who, if anyone, will provide medical
attention to her and the child at birth. This choice is circumscribed by
legal restrictions limiting the number of acceptable choices available to a
“good mother.”
In medicalized birth the doctor is always in control while the key
element in humanized birth is the woman in control of her own
birthing and whatever happens to her. No patient has ever been in
complete control in the hospital—if a patient disagrees with the
hospital management and has failed in attempts to negotiate the care,
her only option is to sign herself out of the hospital. Giving women
choice about certain maternity care procedures is not giving up control
since doctors [decide] what choices women will be given and doctors
still have the power
to decide whether or not they will acquiesce to a
216
woman’s choice.

More than eighty-six percent of all hospital births are attended by
physicians, who are often criticized as being proponents of medicalized
217
birth. A recent trend in birth choice in the United States is to eschew
the services of a physician and use alternative providers—midwives—to
218
facilitate a kinder, more gentle birth. There are several types of
midwives, and each has different legal status, degree of legal regulation,

214. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 72.
215. The treatment of pregnant women may vary depending upon the pregnant woman’s social
status. Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1657, 1661–64 (2008)
(outlining the discriminatory application of drug-related laws to pregnant women).
216. Wagner, supra note 205, at S26.
217. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12; Block, supra note 211, at 263.
218. This is not to say that all physicians subscribe to a medicalized view of birth, or that all
midwives do not. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07.
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educational requirements, and type of organization. Even though many
220
Certified Nurse Midwives, one type of midwife, practice in hospitals,
they are seen by some as a viable alternative to the medicalization of
221
birth. Still, many fewer hospital births are attended by midwives as
222
compared with physicians, even though studies suggest that births
attended by midwives (as well as births at home) are as safe as or safer
than physician-assisted births for women with uncomplicated
223
224
pregnancies. But midwives face a patchwork of legal regulations.
In midwifery-related jurisprudence, Roe has been used by courts as
both sword and shield against pregnant women. For example, one court
wrote that Roe and its progeny provide no privacy protection for women
wanting midwives, thus limiting access to such providers: “The right to
privacy which protects a woman’s choice to have an abortion has never
been interpreted to guarantee a woman the right to choose the manner
225
and circumstances in which her baby is born.” Another court used Roe
to find a legitimate state interest in regulating midwifery and limiting
226
access to midwives. Thus, once the woman has had sex that leads to
procreation, ritualization of birth seals the deal: as a mother-to-be she is
desexualized and pregnancy and birth rituals further entrench her in her
socially and legally defined role as a mother.
As discussed previously, Roe’s applicability to women’s health issues
outside of the abortion context—including midwifery—is questionable.
This is, in part, because it is unclear what parts of Roe are essential
227
holdings and what parts are dicta. Roe states that it is permissible to
regulate the qualifications of the abortion provider, the location of the
procedure, and the applicable licensing requirements, but this approval is

219. For detailed information on the types of midwives, see Comparison of Certified NurseMidwives, Certified Midwives, and Certified Professional Midwives, Am. Coll. of Nurse-Midwives
(Mar. 2011).
220. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12–13.
221. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 24–25; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07; Rebecca A.
Spence, Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores
Birthing Rights, 19 Cardozo. J.L. & Gender 75, 93 (2012).
222. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12.
223. Christopher Rausch, The Midwife and the Forceps: The Wild Terrain of Midwifery Law in the
United States and Where North Dakota is Heading in the Birthing Debate, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 219, 227–30
(2008).
224. For detailed information, see Comparison of Certified Nurse-Midwives, Certified Midwives,
and Certified Professional Midwives, supra note 219. Additionally, midwives may have difficulty with
insurance reimbursement, finding physicians willing to supervise their practice, or getting hospital
privileges. Susan Corcoran, To Become a Midwife: Reducing Legal Barriers to Entry into the Midwifery
Profession, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 649, 651 (2002).
225. Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987).
226. Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1995).
227. See Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework,
51 Am. J. Legal History 505, 506–08 (2011).
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given in the context of abortion services, and it does not speak to any
228
extension of the holding outside of that factual context. Nonetheless,
some in the midwifery community appear to concede that an expansive
229
reading of Roe supports arguments to curtail or regulate midwifery.
Restrictions on midwifery are based on the ritualized treatment of
230
labor as a medical condition. As in abortion jurisprudence, even before
birth, women are treated as mothers whose first priority is their baby, not
231
as women who can make autonomous healthcare decisions. Legal
barriers to midwifery have the attendant consequence of driving women
into the traditional healthcare system, where technology is omnipresent
232
and where “good mothers” take advantage of it. These medicalized
rituals are a welcome aspect of birth for some women, yet for those who
seek an alternative path to childbirth, even one that has been shown to be
safe for mother and fetus, rejection of prescribed rituals opens the door to
further legal limits on reproductive autonomy, such as where the birth can
take place and what type of birth—vaginal or cesarean—will occur.
2.

Locating Birth
233

The location of birth is closely linked to who attends birth. Again,
the location of birth triggers the State’s interest in “maternal” health as
conceptualized in abortion regulation and, thus, ritualization is present.
And again, this regulation of “motherhood” takes place before a woman
actually becomes a mother.

228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
229. One person in the midwifery community said that “[i]n short, if a state can require persons
performing abortions to be licensed doctors, then a state can require that persons assisting births be
licensed doctors, nurses or midwives as well. This is why midwifery proponents should never argue
that Roe v. Wade supports a mother’s right to choose her manner and place of giving birth. . . .
Because midwifery involves the birth of a child after viability, assisted by a nonphysician, Roe v. Wade
is not good precedent for a privacy argument.” Erik L. Smith, Midwifery and the Constitution,
65 Midwifery Today 33, 35 (2003). For an examination of Roe’s impact in other non-abortion
contexts, see generally Susan Behuniak-Long, Roe v. Wade: The Impact of An Outdated Decision on
Reproductive Technologies, 8 Pol’y Studies Rev. 368 (1989).
230. Marsden Wagner, Born in the USA: How a Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed to
Put Mothers and Infants First 108 (2006); Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to
Universal Legalization, 13 Health Matrix 325, 330–32, 367 (2003).
231. Lynn M. Paltrow, Missed Opportunities in McCorvey v. Hill: The Limits of Pro-Choice
Lawyering, 35 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 194, 221–22 (2011) (discussing the lack of concern in the
law for the regret and emotion women feel when their labor and birth choices are not respected).
232. Kiki Zeldes & Judy Norsigian, Encouraging Women to Consider a Less Medicalized
Approach to Childbirth Without Turning Them Off: Challenges to Producing Our Bodies, Ourselves:
Pregnancy and Birth, 35 Birth 245, 249 (2008).
233. See Spence, supra note 221, at 92–93 (“Reproductive justice demands that all pregnant people
have an equal opportunity to make and exercise decisions about their care, including out-of-hospital
birth. While no state regulates the location where a woman must give birth, all states have the power
to license and regulate health professionals who attend birth as a component of state police power.”).
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Although nearly one hundred percent of births took place in a
234
hospital in 2011, not all women want hospital births; some women seek
to give birth at a birthing center or even at home. Birthing centers are
typically locations where women are often attended by midwives in a
235
Home birth is
setting that is less medicalized than hospitals.
controversial; a 2012 study goes as far as to propose that countries should
establish home birth support, as “there is no strong evidence . . . to
favour either planned hospital birth or planned home birth for low-risk
236
pregnant women.” But the legal ramifications of giving birth at home
can be dramatic for both the pregnant woman and any medical
237
professional who may help her.
238
Birth outside of hospitals is constrained. For example, there is a
significant economic barrier for women wanting home birth; even
professionals who can attend such births legally are often not covered by
239
private insurance, forcing the costs onto the pregnant woman.
Moreover, women can be prosecuted for their birth choice, the ultimate
retribution for rejecting the traditional ritualization of birth, and some of
these cases cite Roe in their analyses of women’s reproductive rights in
240
the context of home birth. Whether one agrees with the pregnant
woman’s decision or not, at a minimum, the very existence of criminal
prosecution may have a chilling effect on this form of non-medicalized
childbirth, limiting a woman’s choices. This may have the consequence of
solidifying the ritual of the hospital birth.
234. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12.
235. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 23.
236. Ole Olsen & Jette A. Clausen, Planned Hospital Birth Versus Planned Home Birth (Review),
Cochrane Library, Sept. 2012, at 1, 15.
237. Anna Hickman, Born (Not So) Free: Legal Limits on the Practice of Unassisted Childbirth or
Freebirthing in the United States, 94 Minn L. Rev. 1651, 1653–54 (2010); NFOM Frequently Asked
Questions,
Neb.
Friends
of
Midwives,
http://nefriendsofmidwives.weebly.com/
faqs.html#abouthomebirth (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (stating that Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwives
who attend a home birth purposefully may be guilty of a felony).
238. Regulations governing licensure impact women’s ability to labor at home. Home-Birth
Advocates Push for Change in Laws, NBC News (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/28901624/ns/health-womens_health/t/home-birth-advocates-push-change-laws/#.T6vcSK75878;
Hickman, supra note 237, at 1658; Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State
Legislative Preferences for Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 61, 70 (2004).
For example, many nurse-midwives must be supervised by physicians, who often will not supervise
home births for liability reasons.
239. Home-Birth Advocates Push for Change in Laws, supra note 238.
240. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Mass. 2012) (reversing conviction of woman for
involuntary manslaughter, discussing “whether a woman in the midst of unassisted [home] childbirth
may be held criminally responsible for . . . ‘inflicting fatal injuries on a viable and near full term fetus
during the birthing process’”); United States v. Jumper, 3 Fed App’x 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2001) (saying,
in the context of an involuntary manslaughter conviction, “[t]he evidence fairly supports the inference
that Jumper knew that the health and life of her child were endangered by her decision to give birth at
home without any aid”).
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The regulation of midwives and birth locations goes much further
than the women’s health regulation contemplated in Roe: by the point of
labor, the woman has already accepted her maternal role and the
inevitability of birth is no longer a concern. Still, the State influences
pregnant women’s choices regarding how a pregnancy should progress
and thus dictates whether a pregnant woman is acting as a “good
241
mother” when she makes those choices.
The relationship between laws related to midwifery, home birth, and
labor regulates women’s birth choices and serves to promote a certain
ritualized form of childbirth, regardless of a woman’s choices: a
medicalized birth. At the point of birth, women are heavily invested in
the management of their own birth process, hence the emergence of socalled birth plans in which women express in writing their desires
regarding how, where, and with whom childbirth is to proceed, the
242
ultimate expression of reproductive management. Yet despite these
private documents, purported State interests may trump a woman’s
desires. When the regulations concerning where and with whom birth
may occur are read together, it appears that the State is invested in the
ritualization of a medicalized birth, just as it was invested in a ritualized
abortion process. But ritualization goes further—all the way to labor and
delivery, which, if medical orders are not followed, may result in courtordered medical intervention.
3.

Accomplishing Birth

In some circumstances, labor does not culminate in vaginal birth;
rather, a baby may be born by cesarean section, a procedure by which
243
the baby is removed from the woman via an incision into her uterus.
Once uncommon, the percentage of cesareans in the United States was
244
almost thirty-three percent in 2011, more than double the estimated
maximum safe percentage of cesarean births set by the World Health
Organization and United States health agencies; many cesarean sections,
245
therefore, are likely unnecessary. Cesarean sections are not without
risk: many minor complications, such as infection, are possible and, most
significantly, cesarean birth presents higher maternal death rates than
246
vaginal delivery.

241. Paltrow, supra note 16.
242. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 294–97.
243. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 424–27.
244. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 13.
245. Denise Grady, Caesarean Births Are at a High in the U.S., N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/24birth.html.
246. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 288–89.
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Cesarean sections are becoming a cornerstone of ritualized birth:
not having one can exemplify bad “motherhood.”
As long as she has formally consented to Cesarean surgery, the case is
assumed to be an easy one: her decision should be effectuated. When
she has refused, however, the question becomes whether the state can
override that choice. Conventional legal analyses thus pose questions
such as: 1) Does the right to decide whether to procreate necessarily
imply a right to decide how to procreate?; 2) Does the state’s interest
in the life and health of a full-term fetus outweigh the woman’s right to
refuse medical treatment?; 3) Does the duty of a parent to rescue a
child in danger extend to a mother carrying a full-term fetus? Does
it
247
apply even when the rescue involves a risk of death to the mother?

Discussing what type of birth constitutes ritualization is complex.
Certainly the high rate of cesarean sections suggests that, increasingly,
the correct ritual in terms of medicalization and being a “good mother”
may be a cesarean section in some circumstances. Legal decisions have
made clear that in some cases, the State thinks “mother” does not know
best when it comes to birth choice. In the context of abortion, for
example, the Casey Court says, “[n]or can it be doubted that most
women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus
248
relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.” Imagine, then, any court’s
reaction to a mother-to-be deciding against having a cesarean section
when told to have one by a medical professional.
In several cases, laboring or critically ill women have been forced to
have a cesarean section by court order. In one example, a pregnant
woman was forcibly restrained and drugged under the watch of a
horrified partner when she refused a cesarean section in favor of a
249
vaginal delivery. Other women have gone into hiding to avoid State250
compelled cesarean sections, and refusal to have a cesarean, even when
the child is subsequently born healthy, has been considered in abuse and
251
neglect proceedings.
In compelled cesarean section cases, the law that is supposed to
protect women’s reproductive choices, at least in the context of abortion,
Roe, may actually be used against women when they choose a birth
252
strategy that is contrary to the provider’s suggestions. Again, on its

247. Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 497.
248. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
249. See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen, Avoiding the Melissa Rowland Dilemma: Why Disobeying a
Doctor Should Not Be A Crime, 10 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 1, 35–37 (2006) (describing the compelled
cesarean section of a Nigerian woman, whose husband later killed himself).
250. Charity Scott, Resisting The Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders:
A Reconsideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 615, 674 (1994).
251. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009).
252. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 160, at 325.
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surface, Roe’s simultaneous interest in “maternal” health and fetal life
may seem applicable in situations where a court forces a woman to have
a cesarean section—especially given the proximity of the woman to
motherhood. Seemingly, if a woman aborting a fetus is “maternal” in
Roe, so too would be a woman approaching birth. However, courts
forcing women to have cesarean sections use Roe to amplify the woman’s
function as mother and the necessity of State intervention because of her
253
failure to assume a maternal role for the benefit of the fetus. Whether
sex was initially for pleasure or procreation, once pregnant, the woman is
viewed as a mother and is expected to participate in the rituals
surrounding that role accordingly. That is what a “good mother” does.
The expanded use of cesarean sections exemplifies shifts in how
society sees childbirth, shifts that can “evolve into normalized practices,
not only normalizing the obstetrical interventions but also their
underlying assumptions about women’s emotional and physiological
254
insufficiency in labor and delivery.” So, in the context of forced
cesarean sections, the law may not only reflect judgments of the laborrelated decisions women make, but also the physical capacity of women
to labor without paternalistic direction from the State.

IV. The Future of Women’s Health Regulation?
Desexualization and ritualization have served both as signals and,
arguably, tools of State intervention in women’s health, but how might
desexualization and ritualization be used in the future? To an extent,
these concepts rely on one another to function. While desexualization is
the means by which sex is defined as solely procreative, ritualization
further redefines the woman who took part in sex as a mother by treating
her as one, regardless of whether she intends to carry the pregnancy to
term. A woman’s choice to have sex for pleasure can be devalued via
desexualization, and that disapproval may be reinforced via ritualization
or a woman can be subjected to ritualization as a means of devaluing her
sexual choices.
Reproductive health choices in the areas of contraception, abortion,
pregnancy, and birth suggest that accepting even a constructive State
interest in women’s reproductive health may come with a cost: the loss of
autonomy concerning personal health decisionmaking. That cost may
increase as State intervention increases. For example, given the State’s
ostensible efforts to “protect” maternal health at present, might the next
253. Id. Another argument is that the State interest in maternal health is so strong that it
overwhelms the woman’s interest in autonomy. This, however, is not borne out in case law, which
focuses on fetal health. See generally Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51 (discussing
the minimization of the health risks of cesarean sections).
254. Bergeron, supra note 162, at 486.
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step be to protect potential maternal health and to intervene more
255
aggressively in women’s sexual choices earlier in or prior to pregnancy?
If so, desexualization and ritualization in reproductive health law may
boost any effort to “protect” women’s health, which emphasizes why
protections should be carefully scrutinized. Nonetheless, women need
the law to recognize the inherent importance of women’s health but must
also deal with the negative consequences of what that recognition can
256
mean for their autonomy.
A. Desexualization and Ritualization Going Forward
Whether desexualization and ritualization are tools affirmatively
used to manufacture mothers or to simply serve as signals that state
involvement in women’s health is present, they raise an important
question: to what extent do we want the State to be involved in
regulating, or protecting, women’s health generally and women’s
reproductive health specifically? Two examples of the potential
application of desexualization and ritualization, one in the context of
contraception regulation and a second in the context of abortion
legislation, show that the answer to this question is not obvious.
Contraception is one example of an area of reproductive health
regulation in which we may see more desexualization and ritualization.
As previously discussed, current controversies surrounding contraceptive
coverage and emergency contraceptives show that expanding the
availability of contraceptives is a political landmine. For example, future
legislation might seek to force women to read and sign a state-authored
“informed consent” document akin to those used in the context of
257
at the time they receive contraceptives—emergency or
abortion
otherwise. Documentation could appear on a receipt or even the
258
electronic keypad when you swipe your card at checkout. Such a
regulation would be yet another way to desexualize women who have sex
for pleasure by putting them through a ritual of motherhood in the form
of a pseudo-medical “consultation” via the reading of state-authorized
“medical” information. Moreover, such a law would mirror ones already

255. Although not discussed in this Article, conceptualizing women’s health as maternal health
may also impact women’s rights in relation to assisted reproductive technology. See generally
Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change, supra note 68; Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic
Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 Emory L.J. 843 (2007).
256. See infra Part IV.B.
257. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-3 to -4 (2013); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-33, -35 (2013);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6709 (2013); see also supra note 187.
258. This is not to say that such a law would meet regulatory or constitutional requirements. See,
e.g., John Schwartz, Oklahoma Judge Blocks Law Limiting Morning-After Birth Control, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 2013, at A11.
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approved by courts in the context of abortion. But dismissing the utility
of such a regulation out of hand may ignore a hypothetical benefit.
Certainly adding an informed consent requirement could, if the
information was accurate and apolitical, protect women’s health to some
limited extent by informing women as to the safety and efficacy of the
260
medication. However, the implication of forcing a woman to read such
“informed consent”-type information is that a woman would not
otherwise read about the medication or consider the risks inherent in
taking such medication.
As the contraception hypothetical shows, legal intervention in
women’s health has costs, such as the loss of autonomy, and potential
benefits, such as the provision of medical knowledge, if executed
apolitically. Thus, desexualization and ritualization may not necessarily
be harmful in every context. At a minimum, however, their presence
should counsel further consideration of how a law with them operates.
The presence of both the benefits and detriments of desexualization
and ritualization are also seen in the context of abortion. Prior to
Gonzales, reproductive rights jurisprudence mandated exceptions to
abortion restrictions when a pregnant woman’s life or health was in
261
danger, but the status of the health requirement is now uncertain. Since
Gonzales, activists have decried the shrinking of so-called “health
262
exceptions” in abortion law. Efforts to reinvigorate them, however,
may come with both benefits and costs.
Recently, controversy has arisen over abortion bans passed under
the guise of preventing “fetal pain” during an abortion procedure: these
263
laws are often called “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection” acts.

259. See supra Part III.A.2.
260. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 226 (saying that birth control pills increase the
risk of blood clots, and outlining which women should not use the pill); see Plan B One-Step Product
Leaflet, What You Need to Know (package insert listing possible side effects including changes in
menstruation, abdominal pain, and nausea). Emergency contraceptives in particular are safe under
most circumstances. Id. at 251–53 (noting that some medications may interfere with some emergency
contraceptives).
261. B. Jessie Hill, A Radically Immodest Judicial Modesty: The End of Facial Challenges to
Abortion Regulations and the Future of the Health Exception in the Roberts Era, 59 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 997, 1018–19 (2009) (noting that the decisions in Ayotte and Gonzales “effectively re-opened the
issue of the meaning and scope of the health exception requirement”).
262. See, e.g., Abortion Bans Without Exceptions Endanger Women’s Health, NARAL Pro-Choice
Am. (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-no-exceptionsendanger-women.pdf.
263. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23B-1 (2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-501 (2013); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 40:1299.30.1 (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-3,106 (2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.1 (2013). For
an example of legislative statements related to fetal pain, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6722-6724 (2011)
(“(a) Pain receptors (nociceptors) are present throughout the unborn child’s entire body by no later
than 16 weeks after fertilization and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s thalamus and subcortical
plate by no later than 20 weeks; (b) by eight weeks after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to touch.
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Fetal pain bans dramatically restrict abortion at and after the twentieth
week post-fertilization and contain extremely circumscribed exceptions
264
for women’s health; this effort “indefensibly jeopardizes” women’s
health, according the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and the American Congress of Obstetricians and
265
Gynecologists. Courts have struck down some fetal pain-based bans,
266
but they remain in effect in several states.
Desexualization and ritualization are present in fetal-pain-based
abortion bans. Women are turned into mothers by virtue of the fact that
they are pregnant (ostensibly proving that sex was for procreation), they
have carried the pregnancy for a long period of time, and, when they
want to terminate the pregnancy, they are expected to subrogate their
267
own health needs for the needs of the fetus.
Fetal-pain-based bans are a prime example of the law’s eroding
268
protection of women’s health. The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists and the American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists decried one fetal pain based-ban as “fail[ing] entirely to
269
protect women for whom pregnancy poses serious health risks.”
Certainly, the lack of adequate health exceptions in these laws has been a
270
call-to-arms for pro-choice advocates. The situations of women seeking

By 20 weeks after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to stimuli that would be recognized as painful if
applied to an adult human, for example, by recoiling.”); see State Policies on Later Abortions,
Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf (listing
twenty-week bans and fetal pain-based bans, and defining fetal pain bans as “based on the assertion
that the fetus can feel pain at 18 or 20 weeks postfertilization”).
264. Twenty weeks post-fertilization is the equivalent of twenty-two weeks after the woman’s last
menstrual period. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263. For an example of a fetal pain ban
health exception, see Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.5 (prohibiting the performance of an abortion if “the
probable postfertilization age of the woman’s unborn child is twenty (20) or more weeks, unless, in
reasonable medical judgment, she has a condition which so complicates her medical condition as to
necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and
irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional
conditions. No such condition shall be deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis that the
woman will engage in conduct which she intends to result in her death or in substantial and
irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”).
265. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Am. Cong. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists in support of Appellants and Reversal, Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d
1213 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-16670), 2012, at 13 [hereinafter ACOG Amicus].
266. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013); State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263.
267. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263; ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 8–14.
268. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16.
269. Id. at 8.
270. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, House Subcommittee Amends Federal
Legislation to Ban Abortion at 20 Weeks Nationwide, (June 4, 2013), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/house-subcommittee-amends-federal-legislation-to-banabortion-at-20-weeks-nationwide (“We urge the members of the House Judiciary Committee to
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an abortion at and after twenty weeks suggests that, when it comes to
women’s health, these laws should be revisited to allow these abortions
271
under a broader set of health-related circumstances. But fetal pain bans
demonstrate something else: in addition to focusing on the fetus,
“protecting” women’s health is used by states to justify reproductive
health regulations when the true legislative goal is to restrict women’s
272
reproductive rights. Case in point: the argument made in one case that
later-term abortions pose greater health risks to pregnant women than
273
do earlier abortions, thereby justifying the ban. These types of
274
arguments are disingenuous at best. Every complication associated
with abortion is more common in women carrying a pregnancy to term
and giving birth: a “woman’s risk of death associated with childbirth was
275
approximately 14 times higher than that associated with abortion.” The
State’s purported interest in women’s health was mobilized against
women, not for them.
While health exceptions to abortion regulations have generally been
seen as provisions that protect women, the ritualization and
desexualization present in a wide area of women’s reproductive health
law suggest that a broader health exception may also lead to further
government assertions of a State interest in “health” in non-abortion
contexts. Including a mental-health based health exception, for example,
would require a definition of “mental health” which could be exported to
other, non-abortion law and used to truncate women’s rights to make their
own decisions later in pregnancy or even in non-reproductive-health
contexts. Health protection may come with a price. It may very well be a
price worth paying, but that decision should take into account the history
of health protection and current law and politics before it is made.

respect the Constitution and defend women’s health and rights by rejecting this harmful and
misguided bill.”).
271. A few fetal pain based laws do include limited exceptions. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.30.1 (2013) (allowing abortion for “medically futile” pregnancies); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-161305 (2013) (listing an exception for rape or incest).
272. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (refusing to give
credence to the argument that the ban was enacted to preserve women’s health and citing the title of
the legislation in question, the “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act”).
273. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16 (noting that abortion is “far safer than the only
available alternative—i.e., carrying a pregnancy to term and giving birth”).
274. Id.; McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
275. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16.
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B. Abandoning the State’s Purported Interest in Reproductive
Health
When it comes to legal regulation related to women’s reproductive
276
health, women are in the quintessential double-bind. Most people
would agree that the real issue is not whether the State should take any
action to protect women’s health. For example, few would argue that
more work is not needed to lower maternal mortality. Pregnant women
are at an especially high risk in the United States as compared with the
277
rest of the developed world: Amnesty International calls the United
278
States’ maternal mortality rate “shocking.” Nonetheless, maternal fetal
279
health funding is under attack. The issue is not whether but how and
when the State should act.
Neither wholesale acceptance of State intervention in women’s
health nor the wholesale rejection of State intervention in women’s
280
bodies comes without a cost. Calling on the State to protect women
means that laws and jurisprudence will contain language that allows them
to do so, and, as this Article shows, language that “protects” women’s
health can be used by the state to intervene in their ability to make
autonomous health decisions. Desexualization and ritualization can both
signify and propel this problem. The goal, then, should be to develop
health regulations that are designed to maximize health outcomes with a
minimal degree of legal interference and avoid the legal manufacturing
of mothers through desexualization, ritualization, or both.

276. Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 10–11 (3d ed. 2013);
Chamallas, supra note 60, at 862 (“The feminists’ twin focus on freedom and equality means that no
one legal stance—interventionist or noninterventionist—can ever be presumptively correct without
careful analysis of the power relationships at play in a particular regulatory context.”).
277. Mark Duell, America Has Worst Maternal Death Rate of Any Industrialized Nation, Claims
Shocking Study, Mail Online (May 5, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article1383244/America-worst-maternal-death-rate-industrialised-nation.html.
278. USA Urged to Confront Shocking Maternal Mortality Rate, Amnesty Int’l. (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/usa-urged-confront-shocking-maternal-mortality-rate2010-03-12.
279. News Release, Am. Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Maternal and Child Health
Advocates Decry Impact of Proposed Budget Cuts, (May 22, 2013), available at
http://www.acog.org/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Maternal%20and%20
Child%20Health%20Advocates%20Decry%20Impact%20of%20Proposed%20Budget%20Cuts.aspx
(“The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Association of Maternal & Child Health Programs (AMCHP), March of
Dimes and the National WIC Association (NWA) stand in strong unified opposition to the House
Appropriations Committee’s FY 2014 allocations and urge Congress to invest in maternal and child
health programs in the next fiscal year and beyond.”).
280. West, supra note 41, at 1394; Frances Kissling, Opinion, Abortion Rights are Under Attack,
and Pro-Choice Advocates are Caught in a Time Warp, Wash. Post. (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021802434.html.
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One way for the State to improve women’s health during their
reproductive years is to abandon desexualization and recognize that
women are entitled to have sex for pleasure. By abandoning
desexualization, the State can improve the availability and use of
contraceptives, for example, which is only part of a larger legal regime
that protects the ability of women to make real choices about whether
and when to have children. Increased availability of contraceptives will
both benefit women’s health and save the government money by
281
preventing unplanned pregnancies.
Abandoning ritualization in a continuing pregnancy also holds
promise for improving health outcomes because doing so would require
abandoning laws that nominally, at best, protect women’s health but
diminish their reproductive choices. In the context of abortion services,
abandoning ritualization would require major changes in the way we
view abortion, moving it from a shameful act of maternal avoidance to an
act of reproductive health management. Moving away from medical
rituals in abortion care and diversifying birth choices in continuing
pregnancies may actually improve health outcomes by allowing women
to freely make reproductive choices that are most suitable for their
282
situation.
Ridding laws of desexualization and ritualization will require major
changes in how we view women and reproduction on political, legal,
medical, and societal levels. That will be neither easy nor immediate.
Until then, by examining law and policy for the presence of ritualization
and desexualization, one can determine (1) what is the true goal of a law
passed; (2) the potential that the control over the woman exerted in the
law or policy could be exported to or co-opted by other areas of law; and
(3) whether that potential is worth the risk given the importance of a
health-related goal.

Conclusion
Desire motivates consensual sex. It motivates every action related to
pregnancy, be it to have sex, to prevent pregnancy, to bring pregnancy
about, or to control its progress and end. There can be no child without a
woman. This fact makes women simultaneously the most powerful and

281. Guttmacher Inst., In Brief: Fact Sheet, Facts on Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States 3 (2012) http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html (estimating that
in 2006, expenditures for births resulting from unintended pregnancies nationwide were $11.1 billion).
See generally Jeffrey T. Jensen and Leon Speroff, Health Benefits of Oral Contraceptives, 27
Obstetetrics & Gynecology Clinics N. Am. 705 (2000) (detailing specific health benefits of particular
contraceptives).
282. See, e.g., Home Birth Complications ‘Less Common’ Than Hospital, BBC News (June 13,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-22888411.
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the most vulnerable individuals subject to State regulation. We cannot
escape the fact that women are essentialized by society and by the law
specifically: they are pushed to act like mothers regardless of whether
283
they have children.
Society focuses myopically on abortion as the defining concern in
284
women’s health. By looking at abortion, contraception, and birthrelated care, we see that desexualization and ritualization underlie State
attempts to control women’s reproductive autonomy in a variety of
contexts and that “health” is increasingly used as a political tool instead
of a medical end.

283. Reilly, supra note 28, at 157–58.
284. Paltrow, supra note 16.

